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I. Introduction
We are doomed historically to history, to the patient construction of
discourses about discourses and to the task of hearing what has already
been said.
Michel Foucault1

The name Robert Samek2 first came to my attention in the summer of
1985 as part of a research project carried out under the auspices of the
Law Reform Commission of Canada.3 I was struck by what at the time
seemed to be a complete contrast in two of his publications; his book,
The Legal Point of View4 and an article, "A Case for Social Law
Reform".5 Although only a few years apart, it seemed impossible that the
two works could have come from the pen of the same author: the former
I
I
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*Sessional lecturer, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1. The Archaeology ofKnowledge (London: Tavistock, 1972). Introduction.
2. Former Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
3. I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to the Law Reform Commission of Canada which
made research into Samek's work possible. Particular thanks to Mr. Justice A. M. Linden who
encouraged pursuit of this project. Hans Mohr and Allan C. Hutchinson at Osgoode Hall Law
School also provided criticisms of an earlier draft. All the usual disclaimers apply.
4. New York: Philosophical Library, 1976 (hereinafter L.P. V,).
5. (1977), 55 Can. Bar Rev. 409.
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was traditional, opaque, dull, pedantic and repetitive; the latter
iconoclastic, lucid, fresh, aggressive and inspiring. Further research
reinforced this seeming antinomy; a host of technical articles on contract
law counterbalanced by a series of polemics which appeared to be
somewhere to the left of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, and an
obscure book with a Greek sounding title, The Meta Phenomenon. 6 A
mystery was beginning to develop.7
Making a few inquiries in academia I found that many had heard the
name "Samek", some recalled having "read something of his at
sometime'', and a few even remembered that he had something to do
with jurisprudence, but almost no one could say anything concrete, let
alone enlightening, about his work. As the enigma deepened my interest
heightened and so I contacted the Law School at Dalhousie University
and, at last, a few substantive comments began to emerge: no, he wasn't
schizophrenic; no, he wasn't utopian; yes, he was a sincere, intense,
passionate and committed academic of the highest integrity, but certainly
not in the mainstream of contemporary Canadian legal thinking. A
similar story developed in the course of conversations with past and
present members of the Law Reform Commission who knew Samek.
Having exhausted all my contacts, the conclusion was one of respect
. for, but relative ignorance of, the person and his work. My curiosity
unsatisfied, I decided that there was only one thing for it, to put my nose
to the grindstone and do the research myself. This entailed a reading and
re-reading, analysis and counter-analysis, critique, reflection and synthesis
of over thirty articles and two books.8 In one sense, my task was made
easier by the conspicuous lack of response to, and critical commentary
on, Professor Samek's work,9 which meant that I did not have to rebut
any counter-interpretations. In another sense, however, I felt isolated,
unsure if I was on the right track and concerned in case I was
misinterpreting the work. Despite some lingering reservations, 10 I now
6. New York: Philosophical Library, 1981.
7. At about the same time I had just finished reading Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose.
8. For an indispensable and almost complete bibliography of Professor Samek's work see,
(1985), 7 Dal L.J. 469 Appendix A. It omits only one early article, "Contracts for Work and
Materials and the Concept of Sale" (1962), 36 A.L.J.. Further, his last two articles have now
been published: "Language, Communication, Computers and the Law" (1985), 7 Dal. L.J.
196 and "Euthanasia and Law Reform" (1985), 17 Ottawa L.R. 86.
9. Although the L.P. V. received several reviews most of his other work has been ignored. The
only exceptions that I have found are Professor Fridman's unduly sarcastic response to Samek's
developing theory of contract law with the Disneyesque title "Restitution Revindicated or the
Wonderful World of Professor Samek" (1979), 29 U. of T. L.J. 160 and Underwood-Lewis'
passing comments in his "Survey of Canadian Law: Jurisprudence" (1984), 16 Ottawa L.R.
172 at 175-81.
10. I should also point out that my interest in jurisprudence is from the legal not the
philosophical perspective and that my familiarity with philosophy is, at best, sketchy. All due
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feel comfortable with Samek's work and confident enough to present this
reconstruction of his theory in order that his thoughts will be more
accessible to those who might be interested.11
II. Law, Morals and the Legal Point of View
Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same ...
Michel Foucault 12

As early as 1963, while still specializing in Commercial Law, Samek
tentatively began to articulate his longstanding interest in linguistic
philosophy and apply it to legal problems. Although it is a brief article,
"The Concepts of Act and Intention and their Treatment in
Jurisprudence"13 is important for at least four reasons.
First, with what will become characteristic zeal, Samek questions the
wisdom of the mens rea/actus reus dichotomy fundamental though it is
to the common law tradition. Second, he utilizes as the basis of his
critique "ordinary language analysis". He claims that although in
ordinary usage there is an important distinction between "intentional"
and "voluntary", when we say that "A does X" there is a presumption
that Ns act is both voluntary and intentional,14 that ''prima fade an agent
is responsible for his act". 15 The upshot of this, in Samek's opinion, is that
not only is it superfluous to qualify an act as both voluntary and
intentional, but also that "act and intention can only be understood if we
recognize their interdependence".16 They cannot be separated, and in
purporting to do so criminal discourse distorts ordinary language usage.
The only qualification he adds is to allow for "negative usage", that is,
apologies to any philosophers who may be appalled with the poverty of my philosophy - the
faults lie with me, not with Samek who was very familiar with an incredible variety of modern
thinkers.
11. Before proceeding further, two caveats are necessary. First, for reasons of time and space
I have barely touched upon Samek's theory of contract law, but I would suggest that, with the
benefit of hindsight, it does fit within his programme of radical social, political and legal
transformation insofar as it is a courageous attempt to reform contract law from within and to
make it respond in a humanitarian and equitable way to the conflicts which it is called upon
to resolve. Secondly, I wish to make it clear that the purpose of this article is very modest; it
is an attempt to provide a guide, a map if you like, to Samek's sometimes very elusive and
therefore difficult arguments. As such, although I have reservations about certain of his claims,
I have kept my own critical commentary to a minimum. I make no apologies for the parasitical
nature of this article for my intention is exposition in order to facilitate and stimulate discourse.
Bob Samek had important things to say and it seems to me that current Canadian
jurisprudence can do with all the input it can get!
12. Supra, note 1 at 17.
13. (1963), 41 Australasian Journal of Philosophy 198.
14. Id. at 216.
15. Id. at 205.
16. Id.
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reference should only be made to intent and voluntariness in order to
negate any attempt to reduce Ns responsibility for X.
Third, the article demonstrates Samek's iconoclastic propensity, his
willingness to challenge the heavy artillery of English Positivism. He
argues that the dichotomy of act and intention stems from John Austin's
narrow view that acts are "muscle movements", and that Austin's
jurisprudential heirs, including Salmond and Glanville Williams, have
failed to transcend this unidimensional interpretation. Samek's own view
is that "an act is an intervention in a state of affairs"17 which may include
muscle movements but also incorporates much more, such as "acts of
concentration and endeavour" and even "omissions", 18 that is, acts which
have no physical basis.
Finally, we are cautiously introduced to what is perhaps the key
argument of Samek's early jurisprudence, the idea of "the point of view".
Drawing on the work of, inter alia, G.E.M. Anscombe and J.L. Austin 19
he claims that "there is no such thing as the authoritative version of what
the agent does".20 Samek's argument is that an agent may appear to be
doing a variety of things depending upon the perspective of the person
observing the activity. For example,21 a lawyer and a lay person· both
observe the same fact situation: A and B are arguing in a bar, A strikes
B, B breaks a glass and thrusts it into Ns face. To the lay person it is a
pub brawl, to the lawyer it is a situation which raises issues of assault, self
defence and excessive force. Samek's thesis is that the same fact situation
can be interpreted in different ways depending upon the observer's "point
of view" - to the lay person, it's an ugly fight, to the lawyer it raises
questions of law. 22 What he is suggesting is that there is no objectively
17. Id at 207.
18. Id at 208. It is important to note, however, that although omissions may be perceived as
interventions, Samek posits that "this usage is to be deprecated". Samek at this stage in his
development, is unwilling to go too far. However, over twenty years later in "Euthanasia and
Law Reform", supra, note 8 he argues forcefully that the dichotomy of act and omission is
false, at least with regard to life-support machines.
19. Samek's earlyjurisprudence and his theory of contract law are heavily inspired by Austin's
ideas. Samek's present claim is derived from Austin's "A Plea for Excuses" (1956-57), LVII
Proceedings ofthe Aristotelean Society N.S. 1.
20. Supra, note 13 at 209.
21. This is my example, not Samek's.
22. There is of course no reason why the lawyer cannot also see it as an ugly fight; however
because of her training and lifestyle, she tends to see the world through a legalistic grid.
Similarly when a lawyer and an architect observe Bay Street, Toronto, the lawyer tends to
think of the legal transactions going on behind the glass and the architect wonders (in horror?)
at the structures. For polemical criticisms of the legalistic weltanschauung see Duncan
Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction ofHierarchy (Cambridge, Mass.: Afar, 1983)
and Stephen Halpern, "On the Politics and Pathology of Legal Education" (1982), 32 J. Legal
Ed.

....
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true right answer, that the best we can do is to seek an answer to the
necessarily subjective and limited question which is asked from "our
point of view in the given situation . .."23 When applied to the legal
question of whether an agent is responsible for her act so that she cannot
plead an excuse, Samek suggests that:
for that task it will be sufficient to establish that the act under the
description in which we are interested (i.e., from the legal point of view,
R.F.D.) was an act which the agent decided to do.24

In short, Samek is willing to presume that from the legal point of view the
agent intends her_ acts and that actus reus and mens rea questions are
unnecessary except to rebut possible defences.
Samek's nascent critical consciousness becomes more explicit the
following year with "The Dynamic Model of Judicial Process and the
Ratio Decidendi of a Case".25 Two central arguments emerge from this
clear and cleverly constructed paper; first, that the doctrine of ratio
decidendi, insofar as it is based upon a static model of the judicial process,
is both untenable and misleading; second, judicial creativity through a
dynamic model of the judicial process is both inevitable and desirable.In
brief, Samek seeks to introduce clarity, realism and honesty into our
thinking about the judicial process.
Samek constructs his thesis on the (broken) backs of Hart, Cross,
Simpson, Derham and Levi, all of whom, he claims, in their espousal of
the doctrine of binding ratio decidendi, are ultimately committed to a
static model of the judicial process.He posits that such a model:
depicts the judicial process essentially as a process of classifying or
subsuming new fact situations under existing rules ... (and necessarily)
presupposes a legal system consisting o_f closed rules.26

For Samek such a presupposition is invalid. Following H.L.A. Hart he
argues that "the nature of the judicial process", the "ramifications of law"
and the range of possible fact situations inevitably make for "a system of
open-textured rules".27 Consequently there is a disturbing contradiction
between the traditional theory of the judicial process and the inevitable
reality of activist judicial interpretation.
It is important that we notice the depth of Samek's critique. He is
explicitly rejecting both rule formalism and the obedience model which
are two of the basic tenets of traditional legal positivism. He argues that
a command cannot be a command if it is equivocable, and that rules are
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Supra, note 13 at 207.
lei at 211.
(1964), 42 Can. Bar Rev. 433.
lei at 435.
lei
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inherently indeterminate. Although he uses Hart's idea of "open-textured
rules", he goes beyond him in claiming, "nor will it do to say that the core
of a rule may be certain even if the penumbra is not".28 Samek is pointing
to the "structural indeterminacy of all open-textured rules"29 both in
ambit and content. The static model of the judicial process is therefore
deprived of its foundation. If the static model collapses, so also must the
ideal of a binding ratio decidendi for not only is it dependent upon the
elusive determinative rules, but also a given fact situation may not be
covered by existing rules or it may be covered by two or more rules.30
Samek even suggests (although he does not provide any argument) that
the concept of a binding ratio is a fiction.31
On the basis of this critique he tentatively adumbrates an alternative
dynamic model of the legal process, one which advocates both the reality
and desirability of judicial activism and creativity. The judges' role is
more than one of mere classification, they are involved in decision
making. The judiciary ought to be concerned with "the good" and not be
mere minions of an archaic past.
... the acceptance of a static model has tended to identify the judicial
process with authority rather than with reason, justice and social policy.It
has resulted in an inverted pragmatism, which clings to judicial
pronouncements, however conflicting, ambiguous and unsatisfactory as
the sole terrafirma in legal analysis.32
But neither must the judiciary be given a carte blanche; hierarchical
deference must give way to progressive critique, 'judicial dicta must be
examined on their own merits and not accepted as revelations beyond
inquiry".33
Three key themes underline Samek's dynamic model of the judicial
process. The first is a recognition that law is functional - it is a means
· 28. Id at 436.
29. Id at 435. The seriousness of his critique is well illustrated by an important footnote,
where he appears to embrace both "fact skepticism" and subjectivism:
Facts are not hard particles which can be classified into "material" and "immaterial".
Our way of looking at the world is conditioned by our interest, by our point of view,
but according to the purpose in hand. The different kinds of maps in an atlas are good
examples of purpose criteria of materiality .... Any description of a fact situation is
influenced by a number of factors including the purpose for which it is made .... (Id
at 436-437, footnote 7.)
By demonstrating relativism through indeterminacy, Samek is gradually moving towards his
critique of "essence" approaches.As will become clear this idea will have matured by the time
oftheL.P.V.
30. Id at 448.
31. Id Samek does not develop this claim, but for a full discussion of his theory of fictions see,
"Fictions and the Law" (1981), 31 U. ofT. L.J.290.
32. Id at 433.
33. Id at 434.
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to a just solution, not an incestuous end in itself. Therefore, it must be
malleable in order that the judiciary can make decisions in a "normative
fashion". Second, since there are no necessarily determinative right
answers, decisions must be based upon the most rational and persuasive
arguments put forward by counsel who "use the authorities" but do not
succumb to them. Flexibility is vital in order to reach the best decision
possible. Third, the judge is not, however, an autonomous moral agent,
"free to make decisions arbitrarily or as he (sic) thinks fit". He must act
in accordance with the obligations of a judge.34 He must recognize
structural constraints as limiting his authority but not totally fettering it.
Legal concepts and authority are "open" and pliable and the judge must
use the techniques of following, distinguishing and over-ruling
conscientiously. Dogma must not trump ductility, and there must always
be a willingness to "blaze new conceptual trails", if possi
ble.35 Acceptance of such a model would obviously require abandoning
the doctrine of binding ratio decidendi but this, claims Samek, would lead
neither to chaos nor catastrophe.
The denial of the binding force of ratio does not prevent us from saying
that a later court has misunderstood a rule laid down by a precedent court.
Similarly there is no reason why there cannot be more than one
construction of a rule laid down by a precedent court. The rule itself is not
a matter of prediction, but the construction of the rule is .. .the denial of
binding force to rules laid down in single cases does not mean that such
rules may not be laid down.36

Although Samek draws on potentially subversive themes such as
subjectivism, relativism, inherent indeterminacy, malleability and
openness, he refrains from outright agnosticism; he seeks merely to
reintegrate law with justice, not to critique either: "Properly understood
the doctrine of precedent is quite consistent with the dynamic model of
the judicial process".37 His liberalism is relative only to the inherent
conservatism of legal positivism.
This transitory streak of liberalism in Samek's theoretical development
emerges in two other articles, one dealing with punishment, the other
with the enforcement of morals. The motivating force underlying
"Punishment: A Postscript and Two Prolegomena"38 is the practical
problem of how to attenuate criminal activity as humanely as possible.
He criticizes other writers in the field for starting at the wrong end of the
34. Id. at 446. See also Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1986). .
35. Id. at 446-7.
36. Id. at 443-4.
37. Id. at 448.
38. (1966), 41 Philosophy 2 l 6.

1 64 The Dalhousie Law Journal

spectrum, in the realm of theory rather than practice; this not only results
in a failure to find any solution, it exacerbates the situation by obscuring
the real problems. Samek again seeks to introduce some clear thinking
into the debate in order to render the issues more accessible and therefore
remediable.
�is first claim is that his predecessors, Flew and Hart and Baier, have
mistakenly confused the concept of punishment with a legal or quasi
legal system of punishment. Samek insists that, on the contrary, the
former need not entail the latter.
All that is necessary for a case of punishment to occur is that a person ...
inflicts deliberately and not primarily for the sake of any beneficial
consequences which may flow from bis action, anything likely to cause
discomfort to a victim who is capable of experiencing it, provided that the
person inflicting the discomfort would claim, if asked to give a reason for
his action, that he is inflicting it because of something ...for which he
holds the victim accountable.39

He argues that with this interpretation there are many acts of punishment
which are clearly non-legal. Punishment can, and must, be understood as
distinct from the legal system.
Second, the above definition also allows us to distinguish the meaning
of punishment from its justification. Therefore, contra Hart, he argues
that punishment is not necessarily retributive because the meaning of
punishment is prior to, and distinct from, its justification. Punishment,
depending on the purpose of the person inflicting it, may therefore be
based upon any one of several diverse justifications, such as retribution,
deterrance, rehabilitation or purgation.
Having made these vitally important distinctions, which enable us to
perceive the issues more clearly, Samek proceeds to his central thesis that
retribution is an inadequate justification for the legal system's use of
punishment. He outlines three arguments to support his claim: first,
retribution presupposes free choice but the law does not permit such
choice; second, a legal system is inherently incapable of dealing with
every wrongdoing, and thus a wrongdoing should only be made illegal if
to do so would, on balance, be beneficial for the community; and third,
retribution is divorced from such social utility, because it believes in the
infliction of punishment as an end in itself and not as a means towards the
communal good. Retribution is therefore incapable of providing
justification for legal punishment.
Samek's own preference (which in retrospect may be overly sanguine)
is to pursue the spirit of Barbara Wooton's enterprise40 and advocate a
39. Id
40. Crime and the Criminal Law, (London: Stevens, 1 964).
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"humane and utilitarian system . . . designed to reduce crime and
rehabilitate offenders".41 He further suggests that any movement in this
direction, adjusted as it will be to "the needs of the community and of
individual offenders", will not involve the infliction of discomfort as an
end in itself and therefore it would be wrong to call it a system of
punishment.
Samek also adopts a liberal stance in discussing the role which the law
should play in "The Enforcement of Morals".42 He opines once again that
the debates are opaque because several distinct issues have been
telescoped by insufficiently reflective analysis. To remedy the situation he
posits that there are four distinct alternative positions on the issue of the
enforcement of morals:
a) the enforcemen� of morals as such in the stronger sense, that is,
every immoral act should eo ipso also be an illegal act;
b) the enforcement of morals as such in the weaker sense, that is, some
immoral acts should qua such acts also be illegal acts;
c) the enforcement of morals in the stronger sense, that is, the
immorality of some acts should be the decisive factor in making
them illegal; and
d) the enforcement of morals in the weaker sense, that is, the
immorality of an act should be a relevant factor in deciding whether
to make it illegal.43
Having cleared the air Samek argues that only (d), the enforcement of
morals in the weaker sense, is defensible. His jµstification is quite liberal
in that he simply recognizes the limits of law: ". . .what is grist to the fine
mill of morality may well escape the clumsy engine of law or be mangled
by it".44 Yet, as shall become clear, he does believe that morality is a
relevant factor in deciding whether to make an act illegal - law and
morals are interconnected. Furthermore, he develops the key theme of
"The Dynamic Model",45 the creative role of the judiciary: ". . . it is more
fruitful to think of legislators and judges as craftsmen who work upon
moral and other values to the form of law for the benefit of the society
they serve".46 It is important to note, however, that in Samek's opinion
such moral activism is legitimate because · in a liberal and democratic
society both the legislators and the judiciary "serve". His purpose in this
article has, in part, been to clarify the issues so that these trusted
personnel can do their task even better.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Supra, note 38 at 229-30.
(1971), 49 Can. Bar Rev. 188.
Id.
Id at 221.
Supra, note 25.
Supra, note 42 at 221.
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Finally, at this stage, Samek also appears to favour Mill's liberal
utilitarianism as the basis for both moral and legal decision-making.
There can be no question of enforcing merely conventional moral values
either through moral or legal sanctions. Only values which have satisfied
the principle of utility can be enforced, and their appropriate mode of
enforcement must be decided on the balance of utilitarian considerations.
Conventional moral values are relevant as candidates to be tested on the
principle of utility for moral or legal enforcement, but they do not
themselves constitute approved moral or legal values.47

The foregoing articles are also important when perceived as prolegomena
to Samek's treatise, The Legal Point of View, because many of the key
themes developed in this later work began their gestation period in these
early essays.
On publication, the L.P. V. was fairly widely reviewed but, in general,
received unfavourable assessment.48 At the very beginning of the book
Samek invokes Wittgenstein and warns us that we must always ask the
right sort of questions. We must always ask - What purpose do we wish
to achieve? It seems to me that some of Samek's critics failed to apply this
criterion to the L.P. V. They failed to ask what was Samek's purpose and
therefore failed to understand what he intended to do. The result is that
some of the criticisms are unfair to Samek, while others are simply off the
mark. By the same token, however, Samek must also share some of the
blame for the poor reception of his work. Most fundamentally, he never
makes his thesis absolutely clear, preferring instead to let it emerge from
a comparison with his jurisprudential predecessors. In my opinion, the
key to understanding the L.P. V. is to be found in the discussion of the
relationship between law and morals, but why Samek decided to leave
this to the postscript remains a mystery.
From a different perspective, the L.P. V. can be perceived as Samek's
first major step away from the dominant tradition in Anglo-Canadian
jurisprudence but without any clear recognition on his part as to where
he wanted to go. It is a protest against the jurisprudential hegemony of
legal positivism - ". . . without justice what are kingdoms but great
bands of robbers"49 - but without articulation of any substantive
alternative.
47. Id at 208.
48. Michael Bayles (1976), 21 Wayne L.R. 191; Alan Watson (1975), 91 L.Q.R. 574; Philip
Slayton (1975), 21 McGill L.J. 164; J. Underwood Lewis (1975), 7 Ottawa LR. 691; S.F.D.
Guest (1975), 6 N.Z.U.L.R.; Randal R. Marlin (1975), 2 Dal. L.J. 553; l.M. Yeats (1977), 6
Adelaide L.R. 178.
49. Samek prefaces his work with this naturalistic quote from St. Augustine, but strives to
avoid the natural law tradition as much as legal positivism. This interpretation of the L.P. V. as
a negative reaction against positivism as opposed to a constructive, novel theory is reinforced
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The L.P. V. is not a particularly accessible book so it might be useful if
I briefly outline the central themes of Samek's thesis.50 The L.P. V. is a two
tiered work; it is both a book in jurisprudence per se and a book about
jurisprudence. Our concern will be with the novel aspect, his "new
organizing concept, or new model . . . call(ed) the legal point of view".51
However, for the sake of completeness we ought to be aware that it is
upon this foundation that he constructs the second, much longer part of
the book, the analysis and evaluation of his jurisprudential predecessors.
He synthesizes and succinctly criticizes four "command theories of law",
those of Hobbes, Blackstone, Bentham and Austin; Kelsen's "norm
model"; Hart's "recognition model" and Fuller's "aspirational model".
His aim is not to "trash"52 them, rather it is to constructively appreciate
their various strengths and weaknesses .
. . . looked at in the light of the new model the old models will acquire
new meaning and a new value; instead of being condemned for their
inevitable failure to capture the true essence of law, they will be judged by
their success in illuminating certain aspects of law which are of value to
the legal point of view. 53

Following Wittgenstein's Philosophical lnvestigations54 he argues that
by a comment he made ten years later in "Language, Communication, Computers, and Law",
supra, note 8 at 196-7:
We must not look for the essence of anything or view it in terms of the conventionally
held approach. There comes a point when this approach is exhausted, when it has
nothing left to offer us,and our inquiries become self-defeating. The prevalent analytical
approach to jurisprudence is a case in point; it is a complement of the legal positivism
it purports to analyse.The worst of it is not the slant of its own perspective as the
blotting out of alternatives. By co-opting all "respectable" opposition, it becomes
tyrannical . . . . Linguistic philosophy has made some valuable contributions to
jurisprudence after it had ceased to be innovative in its own sphere.But now it is played
out; we need new perspectives to lift jurisprudence out of its present rut.
50. For a very useful map on how to read the L.P. V. see, Bayles, supra, note 48.
51. Supra, note 4 at 86-7.
52. Trashing is a method of legal argument currently in vogue through the work of the Critical
Legal Studies Movement. In essence, it is a form of negative critique. Trashing has a very
explicit political intention; it seeks to delegitimize both law and the dominant forms of legal
argument.
53. Supra, note 4 at 87. This aspect of his work need not detain us any further, except to say
that perhaps the greatest strength of the book is his, at times, excellent condensation of the
arguments of his predecessors. Not only does he develop his own insights he also provides
perceptive and lucid outlines of their main arguments and compact compilations of the major
criticisms. This section of the work serves as a valuable introductory text to many of the leading
jurisprudential theorists. One qualification, however, is necessary; rather surprisingly, he
appears to misunderstand Hart's interpretation of Austin.
54. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968). Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Some commentators query
whether his interpretation of Wittgenstein is accurate; I am unqualified to decide. However,
any such criticism seems trivial and purist because it is quite clear what Samek's position is. It
doesn't really matter whether it is Wittgensteinian or not.
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"What is law?" type questions, insofar as they tend to produce responses
which make claims to having discovered objective truths, are doomed to
failure.55 This is so for two reasons: such questions misunderstand both
the nature of the philosophical enterprise which cannot be concerned
with the general, universalizable truths, and the nature of concepts
themselves which are ultimately no more than malleable instruments.
In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein held that language was an
instrument which served different needs and different interests in different
ways and that the main source of philosophical puzzlement was the quest
for generality. 56

Samek agrees with Hart in rejecting "theory built on the back of
definition", but he goes further in claiming that language, even in its
ordinary usag�, is "bent"57 by the context in which it is used. He
concludes that all attempts to seek the essence of law are futile and
inappropriate; in seeking to do too much they overstretch themselves,
ultimately undermining their own valid insights.
Samek's deliberately therapeutic58 response is contextual and
subjective - ". .. the meaning of words vary with and are bounded by
their use in different language games".59 His argument, in brief, is that
55. "For our purpose the most important lesson to be learned from Wittgenstein is this: the
'What is X?' type question tends to initiate the wrong sort ofinquiry. It prompts us to look for
the essence of X which remains constant, independent of the context in which it is used. Thus
the question: 'What is Law?' has led to a wild goose chase after the essence of law." (Supra,
note 4 at 9-10.)
56. Supra, note 31 at 294.
57. Supra, note 4 at 38.
58. This idea of therapy is important in so far as it forces us to recognize the limited nature
of Samek's argument. One of the main criticisms that has been levelled at Samek is that he
never makes it totally clear what he means by "essence oflaw approaches"; he simply claims
that all his predecessors adopted this approach and were thereby fundamentally misconceived
in their projects. Further, since the legal point of view exists in contradistinction to the elusive
essence of law we are also very uncomfortable with it.In defence of Samek, I would suggest
that we identify essence of law approaches with claims to objective truth (that this or that is
necessarily what law is about), and the legal point of view with contextualism, subjectivism,
malleability and relativism - it makes no claims on the monopoly of truth. The legal point
of view is, in Samek's opinion, the most useful way to understand the functions of the
contemporary legal system. Therefore, therapy is all he can offer - all he can do is to show
us where we have gone wrong and let us work the rest out for ourselves. His theory prevents
him from developing any alternative "right answer". Elsewhere he suggests that
the philosopher is like an analyst . .. who does not have to prescribe a cure for a
patient. All he has to do is to find the cause of his entanglement. The object oftherapy
will be to give him a clearer view of his condition and to stop him from worsening it
by worrying over the senseless problems which have brought it about.(Supra, note 31
at 295.)
This therapeutic approach is also an important aspect ofContinental Critical Theory.(See, eg.
Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971) Part Three.)
59. Supra, note 4 at 8.
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words and concepts have no intrinsic essence, rather they vary not only
in time and space but also in their purposive usag�. Consequently, all we
can do is to offer heuristic, functional models which admittedly do not
capture all the divergent uses, but which are still "fruitful" for a particular
purpose which we may have in mind. (As will become clear, Samek's
purpose is to discuss the inevitable relationship between law and
morality.) Such a model is a "provisional corrigible construct, composed
of the building blocks of many other models"60 and, as such, avoids the
problems of the essence of law approaches because it denies the objective
question of true or false and replaces it with the criteria of more or less
fruitful.
In using the concept of "points of view" we avoid the claim of having
caught the essence of law or morality, and limit ourselves to merely
presenting a subjective model of a point of view . . . hence there is no need
to imprison everything that passes for law in our model.61
. . . It does not demand the reduction of the rich and complex ordinary
concept of law to one or more of its aspects.62

To support his argument Samek distinguishes four functions of discourse:
assertion, evaluation, prescription and performance. 63 Only the first two
need concern us here. For Samek, an evaluation is a considered opinion,
acceptable to the best informed opinion in the world.64 An assertion, on
the other hand, is a truth claim, something which is conclusively verified
by the best opinion in the world. He opines that questions of legal
philosophy cannot be assertive truth claims since consensus is
impossible;65 such questions (and their answers) can at best only be
evaluative. With regard to law, we can only offer "an evaluative model
0f a set of postulates which express the speaker's pro or con attitude to
(law) about which he has formed a considered opinion".66 This model is
60. Id at 52.
61. "Law and Morals: A New Approach" (1976), 27 Humanities Association Review 16 at
17.
62. "The Objects and Limits of Law Reform" - unpublished report for the L.R.C. (1976).
In my opinion this extensive report is the most comprehensive, coherent and unified statement
of all of Samek's work. Various of his published articles are spin-offs from this work; for this
reason I often use this as my basic text when there is an overlap. It is a great pity that the
Commission never published this report.
63. Supra, note 4, Chapter Two. These appear to be drawn from the work of J.L. Austin.
Although in the present work Samek only concentrates upon the assertive and evaluative
functions, in a series of articles over a period of fifteen years he strives to develop an objective
theory of contract law based upon the idea of performative utterances subject to infelicious
inequities. An analysis of this innovative approach to the problems of contract law must,
unfortunately, await another occasion.
64. Id at 24-5.
65. Some may interpret this as an identification of truth with consensus. However Samek's
later work on paradigms would reject any such correlation (see below).
66. Supra, note 4 at 26.
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neither true nor false, it can only be evaluated to the extent that it is more
or less fruitful in helping us to understand law.
Samek embraces a relativistic conception of philosophy, jurisprudence
and law.
On these philosophical foundations Samek proceeds to mark out the
field of interest (which he emphasizes is distinct from the essence of law)
occupied by the legal point of view as "that mode of institutional social
control which is enforced through the effective application of a norm
system by courts acting as norm authorities of the system".67 A norm
system (which is what gives the legal point of view its formal structure68)
is a "hierarchical system of impersonal prescriptions, the issuing of the
lower units of which is enjoined or permitted by the higher".69 A legal
norm is valid if it is a "genuine norm of a legal norm system". 70 Samek
also attempts to account for some of the complex functions which law
fulfills in contemporary society by drawing a distinction between "action
guiding norms", that is, permissions, and "committing norms", that is,
obligations.71 Finally, the content of legal norms is adopted from values
from various points of view, especially the moral one which provides the
foundation values of a legal system. Put simply, Samek argues that, from
the legal point of view, the legal system is a norm-enforcing system, laws
are norms, and laws have a moral content.
At first blush, one may be tempted to identify this theory with that of
Hans Kelsen. It is true that there are important similarities - Samek
admits that his theory is constructed from the building blocks of his
predecessors - but there are at least two fundamental differences. First,
Samek rejects the Grundnorm as a "hollow concept", and posits instead
that validity can be derived from a "hydra-headed model", that is, several
distinct ultimate norm authorities may found a system, provided they are
67. Id at 87-8.
68. Id at 339.
69. Id at 54.
70. Id at 73.
71. Id at 62. Several critics have overlooked this distinction and accused Samek of having a
uni-dimensional, coercive and "penal" interpretation of law. Although Samek fails to develop
this distinction he is acutely aware of the various roles which modem law does fulfill. Indeed
one of the motivational forces for Samek in writing the L.P. V. was to allow for the complexity
of law. Elsewhere Samek has outlined the "remedial" and "channelling" functions of contract
law in "The Requirement of Certainty of Terms in the Formation of Contract: A Quantitative
Approach" (1970), 48 Can. Bar Rev. 203; the ideological role of law in "Justice as Ideology:
Another Look at Rawls" (1 981 ), 50 Can. Bar Rev. 787 and; the communicative aspect of law
in"Language, Communication, Computers and Law", supra, note 8. Furthermore, although
law does fulfill a host of functions, ours is an increasingly legalistic society; more and more laws
are perceived as being the solution to more and more social and human problems. Samek may
not be as wrong as his critics might think!
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"logically consistent".72 Second, and more importantly, he rejects
Kelsen's pure theory, through his claim that there is an inevitable
connection between law and morality.
We must look at this last claim in more detail since, as I have already
suggested, it is the key to understanding the legal point of view.
Throughout the treatise Samek recognizes that there are various points of
view: political, moral, legal, legal-philosophical, scientific, aesthetic,
religious, psychological, et cetera. Although he never analyses any of
these in detail he does claim that each point of view "occupies an
exclusive field of interest"73 and that models constructed from different
points of view (that is, for different uses) cannot conflict. Samek applies
this to the relationship between law and morals and argues that the
interest underlying the legal point of view is social control by the courts
and tribunals through· a norm system, while that underlying the moral
point of view is "human obligations qua such obligations and human
aspirations qua such aspirations".74 Contemporary law is primarily
concerned with enforcement, and contemporary morality is primarily
concerned with obligations and aspirations. This positivistic streak in
Samek's work appears to be reinforced when he outlines nine distinctions
between the legal and moral points of view.75
There is, however, another side to the legal point of view apart from
that of repressive enforcement. He posits that there is "an intimate
connection between law and justice",76 that law has an "internal
morality",77 that "law must be fashioned in the image of morality"78 and
that any attempt to divorce the two is "dangerous and futile".79 Indeed,
he even goes so far as to suggest that if "values diametrically opposed to
those which are normally enforced by a legal system" are being enforced
then it is not a legal system. 8° Claims such as these tend to force Samek
into the widely discredited natural law tradition which identifies law with
morality. Samek, however, resists this naturalistic slippery slope by
recognizing that the invocation of naturalism would be yet another
essence of law approach reducing law to morality. He refuses to escape
the Scylla of positivism only to be swallowed by the Charybdis of natural
law.
72. Id. at 185-9. Bayles argues persuasively, however, that Samek's own argument is weak
insofar as logical consistency is an inadequate foundation (see supra, note 48 at 202.)
73. Supra, note 4 at 88.
74. Id. at 316.
75. Id. 317-9.
76. Id. at 341.
77. Id. at 344.
78. Id. at 335.
79. Supra, note 42 at 188.
80. Supra, note 4 at 194-5.
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Samek argues that we need not be impaled on the horns of this false
dilemma, that through what might be called a "foundational theory" law
and morals can be conceived of as two "separate but overlapping
systems".81 Samek's liberating proposal is that the moral point of view
provides the foundation values for the legal norm system which adapts
them to its own requirements.
. . . we must not think of taking over moral rules lock, stock and barrel
. . . they . . . still have to be adapted from their moral environment to
serve the special end of legal enforcement.82

And again,
. . .in my model the characterizing feature of the legal point of view is its
concern with the enforcement of certain values, predominantly moral,
which are ad.apted for that purpose from other points of view through the
machinery of courts or tribunals acting as norm authorities of a norm
system.83

Gradually Samek's own position is beginning to surface as he becomes
more confident of what he wishes to say. No longer is he content to be
descriptive a la pseudo value neutrality of legal positivism. Prescriptivism
begins to emerge. Not only is there an "indirect but permanent"
relationship between the legal and moral points of view, they are, and
ought to be, complementary. "Legal justice presupposes a moral
foundation. If we detach law from morality and make it a creature of
mere power relations, we turn it into a sham".84 He continues,
. . . a judge must adopt the legal point of view, yet he must never close the
door to the moral point of view . . . or he will cease to be a judge of the
law and become its prisoner.85

Claims such as these force Samek to reconsider his earlier argument that
law and morals occupy exclusive fields of interest. Although he reiterates
the thesis, in the course of so doing two significant developments occur.
First, he expands significantly his conception of the moral point of view.
Human rights, from the moral point of view, are reducible either to human
obligations owing to right holders or to human aspirations . . . the moral
point of view is concerned with human values as such and not merely with
the effective enforcement of a particular system of values . . . it is the
universal human dimension, as distinguished from its mere adaptation for
the purpose of a particular technique of social control, that provides the
guiding principle for marking of the legal point of view from the moral
point of view, legal values from moral values.86 (My emphasis added)
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id at 188-9.
Supra, note 42 at 221.
Supra, note 4 at 229.
Supra, note 61 at 18.
85. Supra, note 4 at 320.
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Second, and interconnectedly, he qualifies his earlier argument by
suggesting that although no logical conflict between the two points of
view is possible, practical ones are unavoidable, and then continues:
The only rational solution (of such conflict) will be (for the agent) to
comply with the obligation to which he attaches a higher value . . . the
nature of his choice will depend upon how highly he values the ends
which he seeks to achieve by adopting the various points of view. As a
person becomes more conscious of the rational connection between his
various ends, he may be said to commit himself to a way of life. This will
involve arranging the various ends which he seeks to realize into a
hierarchical order of preference, so that any conflict which may arise
between them can be resolved in favour of the more important end. If we
accept the view that the end - whatever it may be - which a person
seeks to realize through the adaptation of the moral point of view is the
highest end, then in any conflict between that end and any other end the
former must prevail.87

What we are experiencing here is a very important shift in Samek's
position. Previously, as we have seen, he had advocated liberal
utilitarianism but in the course of writing and contemplating the L.P. V. he
seems to have abandoned this position and embraced in its place the
Kantian humanist perspective of the autonomous, free-choosing and
rational moral agent. 88 It also suggests a further shift towards
subjectivism, that individual rationality should be prior to the objective
authority of the law.
Samek, it seems, is torn between two conflicting visions of law: law as
repressive and coercive enforcement, and law as a vehicle for justice. He
has not yet given up on the instrumental potential of law. His
foundational theory is an emotional plea for the mutual reinforcement of
law and justice. This, however, is a double-edged sword. Should law lose
its saving grace of being a means to the end of justice, then the legal point
of view may no longer merit a continued existence.89
III. From Critique to Reconstruction
The way back to reality is to destroy our perception of it.

Bergson90

Not long after the publication of the L.P. V. Samek explained that his
87. Id. at 19.
88. Unfortunately, Samek never tells us why he foregoes utilitarianism. Hans Mohr has
suggested that Samek, like many others in the late 1960s and early 1970s, recognized the limits
of liberal utilitarianism and therefore turned to moral theory in search of an alternative
approach, a move which inevitably led to Kant.
89. Supra, note 61 at 21.
90. Quoted in Jill Vickers', "Memoirs of an Ontological Exile: The Methodological
Rebellions of Feminist Research" in Miles and Finn (eds.) Feminism in Canada: From

1 74 The Dalhousie Law Journal

purpose had been to facilitate an understanding of legal phenomena but
that this is no way implied his acceptance of, or a justification for, the
status quo. 91 From the mid-l 970s onwards, Samek's concern was to
develop his own radical perspective on contemporary law and society
and to provide some indications as to how we might begin to transcend
"the here" and move closer towards "the there." In this section I shall
attempt to reconstruct Samek's multifaceted thesis first by outlining his
critique of contemporary society, the Rule of Law, lawyers, legal
doctrine, justice and rights, and law reform. On this foundation, I shall
adumbrate his own affirmative vision, beginning with his epistemological
claims and progressing to his perceptions of law, justice and rights. In the
final section of this Paper I shall concretize his claims through an analysis
of the theory and praxis of social law reform.
Samek's jumping-off point is his proposal that in order to make any
progress we must begin at the right end of the telescope; we must put
ourselves, our thoughts and our conceptual framework into the
contemporary social context. He posits that
.. . there has been a whole new concatenation of social evils that have
been spawned by the industrial revolution and which have been multiplied
a millionfold by the evergrowing technological power of mass
production.92

Inspired by the New Left, he posits that capitalism and the market
economy are inherently exploitative, that they alienate, dehumanize and
commodify the person into a producer/consumer.93 Modern technol
ogy94 exacerbates this process of reification, with the consequence that
the great ideals and promises of Liberalism have been deflated to
superficial and ephemeral "consumer rights". Distortion, distraction and
perversion are the order of the day.
Government, politics and legislation can only be understood in this
context.Not only is modern government subject to the stultifying weight
and rigid structure of bureaucracy, its function is to represent the various
pressure groups and to juggle their conflicting interests in order to
preserve its own existence through a never-ending stream of ad hoc
91. Indeed, as early as 1973, a year before the publication of the L.P. V., Samek had already
launched his first major broadside against the commodifying and dehumanizing nature of
contemporary society in the course of his proposals for reform of the law in relation to
pornography. "Pornography as a Species of Second Order Sexual Behaviour: A Submission for
Law Reform" (1973), 1 Dal L.J. 265.
92. "Pornography" - unJ?ublished report for the L.R.C. (1976) at 53.
93. Supra, note 91 at 276-7. See also his excellent, "Beyond the Stable State of Law" (1976),
8 Ottawa L.R. 549 at 554.
94. He defines technology as "the system of means employed by men in a given society to
satisfy their social objectives" (supra, note 93 at 551.)
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compromises.95 Politicians, who in general are constrained by their party
platform and the vested interests which support them, preoccupy
themselves with trivia and gloss over the important issues. Not
surprisingly, legislation, the output of this non-system, is ineffective. It is
sporadic, piecemeal and incremental; legalistic; dependent upon its
political "sex appeal" rather than some recognized need; biased;
temporally constrained; externally coercive rather than internally
motivating; and it assumes an essentially static social matrix. 96
Legislation, at best, can only be reformist, incapable of any genuine social
change because it is "locked within the politico-legal framework of the
existing system".97
Samek is equally critical of the legal profession. First, lawyers are a
small interest group who, through their "proprietary claims", 98 have
almost exclusive control over the law and law reform. In a legalistic
society such as ours their monopolistic strength has been an "unmitigated
boon"99 for no one but themselves. Second, they utilize their
manipulative skills at the behest of vested interests, including their own:
.. . with expert (legal) guidance almost everything is possible.Black can
be turned into white, tax evasion into tax avoidance, fraud into legitimate
enterprise. The free enterprise system not only allows but promotes the
exploitation of law for everybody with the money to pay the lawyer.The
adversarial system protects the individual in the jungle by its own
methods. 100

Third, consumerism has enveloped the legal profession so that we now
have the provision of "mechanized professional services to depersonal
ized customers" instead of a sympathetic, needs-oriented response. 101 The
judiciary is also guilty of this system's approach - ". . . some magistrates
work hand in hand with the police and there is no visible accused, only
a succession of files which are opened and shut".102 Fourth, lawyers as
95. For example, he suggests that the federal and provincial governments were not really
arguing about the Charter, rather they were arguing about the balance of power within the
system. The means of power became an end in themselves and the important issues which
ought to have been discussed were either bandied about and bartered or ignored completely.
"Untrenching Fundamental Rights" (1982), 27 McGill L.J. 755 at 771.
96. Supra, note 62 at 12-3.
97. Supra, note 5 at 416.
98. Supra, note 62 at 18.
99. Id at 55.
100. Id at 131-2.
101. Id at 19. Samek lays the same charge against the medical profession arguing that there
are major similarities between these two prestigious and imperialistic professions.
102. Id at 60. It should be noted, however, that Samek appears to have an ambivalent attitude
towards the judiciary, because he qualifies the foregoing statement with, "other judges are
finishing agents for the legislature. They are forever making its crude structures inhabitable for
the law and infuse the bare bones with life" (id). This uncharacteristically benign view of
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practitioners and "realistic" practical men (sic) have a very constrained
sense of vision.They subject the future to the yoke of the present103 and,
at best, will only indulge in legalistic tinkering with the system. Finally,
legal education is identified as being a vital component in the
reproduction of legalistic myopia.Legal acolytes, instead of experiencing
the liberating effects of education,104 are trained to perceive the world and
social interaction through a blinkered legalistic grid; to indulge in legal
reasoning "however unreasoning"; 105 and to adopt a conservative and
retrospective weltanschauung concentrating on doctrine, precedent and
stare decisis. 106 Ultimately, "the pupil ends up like his master . ..
chewing the cud . .. a prisoner of his education and a captive of the
system." 107
judges manifests itself elsewhere, for example, in his praise of Lord Denning's doctrine of
"equitable mistake" and the latter's efforts to bend the law so that justice may be done. See,
"The Synthetic Approach to Unjustifiable Enrichment" (1977), 27 U. of T. L.J. 335.
Furthermore, he praises the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada for its decision in the
Patriation Case, Re Constitution of Canada (1982), 125 D.L.R. (3d) I, in that they refused
either to reduce convention to law or divorce them completely. Either approach, in Samek's
opinion would have been excessively legalistic and poor praxis. "In the circumstances the
(Supreme Court's) decision was probably as wise as it could be. It pointed the finger in the
right direction." ("Law and Convention, A Peep Behind the Patriation Case"(1982), Dal.
Cont. Legal Ed. 30 at 37.)
But again, Samek will not go too far:
We must not overestimate the power of the judges and their capacity to deliver the
goods. Recruited from the profession, they generally continue to wear its blinkers. Their
world is the law and everywhere they struggle like fish in the net. In seeking to escape
the noose they tighten it at every turn. Judges are not so much bound by the rules as
their states of mind. Their education speaks louder than the rules, for it is only through
this that the rules speak at all. (Supra, note 62 at 60.)
It seems to me that Samek is struggling to maintain some firm territory. Having given up on
Parliament and legislation almost completely, he does not wish to relinquish that other arena
of praxis and discourse, the courts. He wants to leave open the possibility that this might be
one area which, if suitably transformed, could be useful for his programme of praxis. It also
allows him to posit that if we could break the ideological power of conservative legal education
and blaze new conceptual and socio-moral t.rails then this might filter up to the courts which,
persuaded by the force of rational argument, might develop the law in a more humanitarian
direction.
I 03. Supra, note 62 at 8.
104. "Legal Education and University Education" (1964), 8 J.S.P.T.L. I .
105. Supra, note 62 at 91.
106. Supra, note 25.
107. Supra, note 62 at 91. Samek also blames legal academics for the sorry state of legal
education. They often act as the minions of the profession, doing the dirty work and preparing
the novices for their integration into the rarified realm of legalism. Elsewhere he makes several
rather caustic comments about the motivation behind much academic scholarship and
discourse. For example, referring to the dialogue between Rawls and his critics, Samek
comments that "in these elevated philosophical jousts, reputations are made but never lost.
What is lost are the underlying issues which remain cloaked by the ideology". ("Justice and
Ideology" (1981), 59 Can Bar. Rev. 787.) For Samek, the means of philosophical discourse in
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Legal doctrine, "the swaddling balms of legal education,"108 is
archetypical of the incestuous fetishism of the contemporary legal system.
Doctrine is not only reified, it is diefied as "the highest diety in the (legal)
pantheon and the centrepiece of the (legal) cult".109 Furthermore it is
narcissistic, assumed to have a life, a logic and a dynamic of its own. 110
Therefore doctrine is both:
socially meaningless and downright harmful .. .
...in a courtroom often nothing is gained.The internal status of law is
often upheld at heavy social cost, and its internal consistency at the price
of deepening contradictions.111

Although Samek moves on from the L.P. V. he never abandons the
basic theme of the book, that coercive repression through enforcement is
the most important (though not the only) function of the contemporary
legal system.112 He delineates a fundamental contradiction in our attitude
to law. First, in a legalistic society such as ours there is a naive belief in
the magic of law - ".. . an astonishing number of people believe that
anything can be done merely by making it law, and that nothing can be
done except through its instrumentality".113 Simultaneously, however, we
distrust both lawyers and the law and strive to curtail their power through
the myth of the separation of powers. Further, since contemporary law is
"incurably repressive" it is "unfit to bear the burdens that have been
thrust upon it".114 He rejects our idolatrous worship of the common law
system arguing that, "It does not follow its own course . . . regulate its
own creation . . . obey its own authorities or set its own pace for
change". 1 1 5
On the contrary, law is inextricably caught up with the moral, social,
economic and political matrix within which it is confined. The Rule of
Law must therefore be open to critique and the legal process evaluated in
action. He argues that not only is the legal process mechanistic, dilatory,
inaccessible, expensive and uncertain, 116 a parasitical encrustation,1 1 7
retrospective and adversarial, preoccupied with technique rather than
pursuit of "the good" have become evds in themselves: publications, reputation and tenure.
Samek's criticisms are a potent reminder to all of us that continual self-reflection on our actions
and intentions is vital if we are not to be carried away on the crest of an egoistic wave.
108. Supra, note 62 at 67.
109. "Law and Convention", supra, note 102.
110. Supra, note 62 at 73.
111. Id at 72.
112. Samek does, however, change his terminology from "enforcement" to "control".
113. Supra, note 62 at 25.
114. Id at 35.
115. Id at 104.
116. Id at 57.
117. Id at 66.
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justice, 118 it is also fundamentally misdirected. It is concerned with
pathological conditions, with superficial ex post facto cures rather than
with the deep structural prevention of things which should never have
happened."Even prophylactic law is negative - it is concerned with the
prevention of harm rather than promotion of good".119 Finally, law too
has become reified and commodified.
Law today is the handmaiden of a materialist, possessive and capitalist
society. Abolish the high regard for property and material possessions and
the need for law will be drastically reduced ...If the law courts still look
like temples, the money changers have invaded them with a vengeance,
and law is regularly bought and sold like a commodity.In all but name,
in fact, our legal system has become largely an appendage to our economic
system.120•

Samek sharpens his critique of contemporary society, law and legal
ideology in his discussions of the tour de force of deontological liberalism,
John Rawls' A Theory of Justice121 and the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. 1 22 In both these articles he makes explicit his antipathy for
liberal society, liberal values and liberal law.
Samek's fundamental criticisms of Rawls are that he is a reformer, that
he assumes that the basic structure of our society is nearly just and that
he believes that compliance with the two principles of justice will bring
us closer to the virtuous society via minor modifications of the status quo.
Samek locates the source of Rawl's misconception in the latter's
"ideological false consciousness".123 He argues that the theory of justice
for a nearly just society jars discordantly with the harsh reality of the
welfare statism of late capitalist society.
For all Rawls' desperate attempts at rationalization the facts do not
support his thesis.The thirst for material benefits has not slackened with
their growth and liberty has been used to swell the demand for consumer
goods and services.People want what they are conditioned to demand by
the prevailing ideology.It is the better off who have the clout that get their
way, and they do not hesitate to press for an even larger share of the cake.
The voice of the worst off - the growing army of unemployed and
unemployables, the single families, the unskilled and the unschooled, the
118. Id at 98.
119. Id at 55.
120. Id at 103-6.
121. Supra, note 107.
122. Supra, note 95.
123. Supra, note 107 at 787. Ideology is without doubt one of the most bandied-about terms
in contemporary moral, political, social and jurisprudential discourse, and consequently has
become almost meaningless. To his credit, Samek does strive to give us some indication of
what he means by the term - although he refuses to give a "definition". However, I must
admit that I am still confused about his interpretation.
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• sick and the incorrigibly poor - remains unheard. Most grudge the
crumbs which are thrown to them to satisfy the conscience of the rich. Not
only are they not being helped by the overconsumption of the higher up
on the payscale, they are paying for it out of the moneys saved on their
keep. Status consciousness and envy have not disappeared and the rational
life plans which are supposed to show the value of liberty are largely
devoted to rising in the hierarchy at the expense of the less advantaged. 124

In short, Liberalism has failed to live up to its promises and has contented
itself with the provision of "consumer satisfaction and career success".125
Having uncovered Rawls' philosophical misunderstanding, Samek
proceeds to challenge Rawls on several disparate grounds, but only two
need detain us here. In bifurcating the political and socio-economic
liberties, giving absolute priority to the former, Rawls does two things:
first, he permits massive social and economic inequality; and second, de
facto he limits legitimate change to reform of the status quo, not its
transcendence.Furthermore, not only is Rawls' theory a "restatement of
the liberal credo",126 it is a legitimation, rationalization and justification
of contemporary society, "putting it on a moral pedestal".127 Rawlsian
justice reinforces an inherently corrupt and inhumane social structure:
He distinguishes between two meanings of idoeology; the first "denotes what Marx
described as 'false consciousness' of a superstructure of a social system or theory"; the second
"stands for the basic ideas which lie at the foundation (of a social system) without any
judgement as to their objective validity". (Id, at 787 and supra, note 95 at 755-6.) In these two
articles Samek appears to choose the first interpretation, although he recognizes that the idea
of false consciousness tends to suggest that there is a true one which can be found be
penetrating the superstructure, a conclusion which, as a subjectivist, Samek is unwilling to
admit. He posits,
We_ can say something is false without knowing the state of affairs because we are clear
that it is not what it is represented to be. The superstructure of a social system or theory
can be considered false insofar as it is out of line with the professed reality of its
foundation. This does not require any absolute standard or a knowledge of what the
true foundation of the society or theory is. (Supra, note 107 at 787.)
Samek's claim is that Rawls' theory of a nearly just society does not fit with the social reality.
However, elsewhere he adopts the second, broader conception of ideology. For example, in
"Beyond the Stable State of Law" he claims that "insofar as social objectives can be
synthesized and stated within the framework of a socio-political programme, they might be
said to constitute an ideology". (Supra, note 93 at 551-2.) And again, in "Language,
Communications, Computers and Law" he delineates the two interpretations and explicitly
chooses the second. (Supra note 49 at 195, footnote 5.)
This inconsistency is a problematic manifestation of his earlier claim that words have no
intrinsic meaning, that they depend upon their author's usage. My own preference is for the
broader "descriptive" interpretation. See "Tales of Centaurs and Men" (1987), 26 Osgoode
Hall Law Journal (forthcoming).
124. Supra, note 107 at 799.
125. Id at 806.
126. Id at 801.
127. Id

1 80 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Rawls' essentially procedural approach ...identifies justice with the Rule
of Law ...and projects the rational unto the actual and the absolute unto
the relative. The established paradigm is put beyond question and acquires
the status of a quasi-divine fiat.128

Samek also vehemently rejects the legalistic usurpation of rights which
has developed them as one of the key tenets of Liberalism. His critique
of rights can be understood on two (interconnected) levels, philosophical
and practical. Echoing Marx, he argues that our current conception of
rights is derived from our "libertarian ideology . . . they have an
individualistic slant and each person is treated as an atomic subject of
rights which are guaranteed against an essentially hostile community". 129
When tied to the adversarial legal system rights tend to polarize rather
than reconcile the parties by encouraging
...a selfish fragmentizing attitude on the part of citizens who are taught
to subject their civic and human aspirations to their alleged self-interest.130

The practical effect of contemporary rights reflect their philosophical
poverty. Samek launches a multi-faceted and scathing critique against the
Charter claiming as follows: despite their appearance of absolutism the
rights contained therein are relative because, of necessity, they have to be
interpreted; the rights are legalistic and courts-oriented; the provisos
render them weakest at the moment when they are most required; the
128. Id at 808.
129. Supra, note 95 at 768. See also Marx's brilliant essay "On the Jewish Question" in Early
Writings, T.B. Bottomore (ed.), (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964)
Much of Samek's critique appears at first sight to be Marxist-inspired; his use of Marxist
slogans and terminology, his adoption of the base/superstructure metaphor, his critique of the
dichotomy of political liberty and economic equality, his portrayal of law as coercion,
ideological mystification and legitimation, and his aspiration that it will "wither away". It
would, however, be a grave error to so categorize him for he is too much of a free thinker to
abandon liberalism only to embrace Marxist dogma. "Nor will a counter ideology open our
eyes; it will close them merely in another direction. Unless we see ideology for what it is, it will
continue to deceive us." (Supra, note 107 at 803.) Samek also makes it clear that the
differences between the western bloc and the eastern bloc may not be as great as we might
think - both are tyrannical. Finally, Samek is inspired by a plethora of great thinkers from
Mill to Hegel, Bentham to Kant, Marx to Neitzsche and Vaihinier to Marcuse. To identify one
as his mentor ignores the breadth of his learning and the power of his intellect. It also suggests
an intention to villify him since "Marxist" is a pejorative term in most legal discourse!
130. Supra, note 62 at 104; see also supra, note 5 at 426. It is interesting to note that Samek
says "alleged self-interest" and not simply "self-interest". The implication here is that selfishness
ultimately contradicts our best interests. Robert Axelrod in The Evolution of Co-operation
(New York: Basic Books, 1984) argues that limited altruism and mercy are more efficient and
benefit the individual in the long run much better than rights claims or the infliction of
punishment. I am grateful to David Cohen for bringing Axelrod's work to my attention. Cohen
has attempted to apply this approach in his "Mercy, Altruism and Mistake in Contract Law"
(unpublished manuscript presented to the Faculty of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School,
November 1985).
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emphasis is on legal procedure not social ends; s. 15 does little for
women, except perhaps to make them more like men; affirmative action
will only provide the appearance of equality for a few; language rights are
merely entrenched in a bureaucratic structure rather than encouraged at
the grass roots level; the rights are non-enforceable against private
individuals; the only real beneficiaries will be the bureaucrats and the
lawyers; the whole constitutional package is a political compromise, not
a beneficial moral or social policy; and worst of all, it is in accordance
with
the great liberal tradition (that) economic rights do not qualify for
inclusion in the political Charter lest they contaminate the purity of its
doctrine with everyday problems. 131

He concludes that the. Charter is unpragmatic "cheap moralizing" 132 "full
of political wind",133 "designed not to change the status quo but merely
to give it greater appeal".134
We can complete our overview of Samek's critical jurisprudence with
a brief analysis of what he portrays as legal law reform. In a series of
articles he develops two ideal-typical models of law reform - the legal
and the social. He suggests that current law reform practices correlate
most closely with legal law reform and that his preferred approach is
social law reform. Legal law reform, cramped as it is "in its legal
ghetto"135, is superficial because it begins and ends with the law and legal
practices, it is controlled and enforced by lawyers, and it is concerned
with purely legal solutions. It assumes, like Rawls and Charter
supporters, that the common law and modern society are nearly just, or
at least perfectable through incremental reforms. More often than not the
result is "legal inflation", more and more laws which are ultimately
counterproductive causing despair, apathy and frustration. 136 The whole
approach tends to make law reform an end in itself, rather than a means
to a social end. At best, it polishes the surface, failing to come close to the
core problems of contemporary society; at worst, it fulfills the ideological
role of mystification and distraction, making it appear as if problems are
being seriously considered and resolved, when in fact the real ones are
merely being moved to the periphery. Legal law reform is mere tidying
up, giving the law a better image through a brush-up and a scrub.137
1 3 1. Supra, note 95 at 756-7.
132. Id. at 761.
133. Id. at 771.
134. Id. at 768.
135. Supra, note 5 at 415.
136. "The Philosophy ofLaw Reform" - unpublished report for the L.R.C. (1976) at 12.
137. Supra, note 5 at 418.

182 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Although Samek is an iconoclast, his aim is not to conduct a nihilistic
scorched earth campaign; on the contrary, his eschatological critique is
intended to be emancipatory, opening up new vistas, new potentials and
providing us with a few concrete suggestions about how we might
proceed.
Perhaps the best way to understand Samek is to go all the way with
him and familiarize ourselves with his "discovery" of the '-'meta
phenomenon".
The meta phenomenon is the human propensity to displace "primary"
with "secondary" concerns, that is, concerns about ends with concerns
about means.The latter come to be perceived as primary, and distort the
former in their own image. The new primary concerns are in turn
displaced by the new secondary concerns about the means to be adopted
to achieve the new consciousness .. .and so on.The progression is not
linear but global.If we think of the total number of primary concerns of
a man, a society, an ideology as a sort of gravitational field, it will be
distorted continually by the pull of a growing mass of secondary concerns.
The result is an increasing loss of balance, a relentless slide to the
peripheral.1 38

Legal doctrine provides a perfect example of the meta phenomenon
process: stare decisis is meant to be a means towards the end of justice in
that like cases are to be treated alike. However, undue deference to, and
respect for, anachronistic authority becomes an end in itself and justice is
submerged in the wake of the dynamic of logical consistency.
More generally, Samek argues that if we can never be sure what is an
end and what is a means, what is primary and what is secondary, we can
never be sure of what is true and what is false. This leads him to make
some very radical claims about the impossibility of absolutism and the
inevitability of conventionalism.
... beliefs such as the earth is flat, matter is solid, space and time are
distinct ...are conventionally true, not absolutely so.The fact that the
truth of certain propositions appears to be unchallengeable does not
guarantee their truth in a transcendent sense ...it merely shows the limits
of conventional truth.139

In brief, Samek proposes that we reject our pretensions to absolute truth
and objectivity and instead content ourselves with the acceptance of
relativism and subjectivism. What we perceive and how we perceive it
depends upon our interpretative structures, and we must struggle against
infusing anything with a transcendent truth value.
Social phenomena are only such by virtue of the paradigm that treats them
as genuine. Recognition of this relativity saves us from factualizing the
138. The Meta Phenomenon (New York: Philosophical Books, 1981) at 4-5.
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world in the image of the prevailing ideology. A true paradigm is itself
contradictory ... there is no correct picture. Every world is constructed;
there is no knowledge, logic or rationality which is independent of
presupposed values.140

The consequences of these claims are manifested in Samek's theses that
change is inevitable; contextualism is essential; subjectivism is
unavoidable; and human agency is vital. 141
Samek rejects the hegemonic belief that the world changes only
incrementally, suggesting instead that we are in a constant state of flux
and that instability and change are the norm. He posits that this lack of
fit between the perception (stability and incremental change) and the
reality (transience) is due to humankind's unwillingness to face up to the
harsh reality of contingency. "Man's craving for stability makes him
suppress the passage· of time and endow the evervanishing now with
permanent significance". 142 Not only is time evanescent, so too is our
conceptual knowledge and its tools. Knowledge is neither absolute nor
universal; such perceptions and understanding are also dynamic. Samek
reinforces his argument by drawing on the work of Donald Schon and
Thomas Kuhn. 143 He develops, and adapts, Kuhn's paradigm thesis to
argue that change, even epistemological change, contra the traditional
gradualist approach, is "revolutionary" and "discontinuous". 144 He
further indicates that the contemporary paradigm, Liberalism, is in fact in
the chaotic post-paradigm stage and that "what is needed is a whole new
system, a whole new way of looking at the world, and trying to change
it"_ 145
If stability is impossible and contingency inevitable the relevant
questions then become - How does change come about? In which
direction ought it to go? These are two obviously interconnected
questions, and Samek's answers are unequivocable. In discussing
technology and its destructive capacity he rejects fatalistic reification and
139. Supra, note 31 at 291.
140. Supra, note 1 07 at 788.
141. In my opinion, Samek's later work demonstrates several of the traits which Jill Vickers
has characterized as "feminist methodological rebellions" (supra, note 90). Vickers' brief article
is very useful as a heuristic device in coming to terms with just how fundamental an alternative
perspective can, and must, be.Whether the radicalism of the perspective is the sole reserve of
feminism is a moot point which goes beyond the confines of this Paper, but I would suggest
that insofar as Samek has been successful his efforts would tend to challenge the feminist
monopoly. The parallels with continental deconstructionism are also revealing.
142. Supra, note 3 1 at 315.
143. Donald Schon, The Displacement of Concepts (London: Tavistock, 1963) and Beyond
the Stable State (New York: Norton, 1973); and Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (2nd ed., Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1970).
144. Supra, note 62.
145. Id. at 88.
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the determinism of the "technological imperative" claiming instead that
"most of our social ills are self-inflicted not preordained", 146 and that the
fault lies with the dominant ideology which permits the appearance of the
autonomous technological dynamic.
It is our ideology that has perverted technology for its own exploitative
ends. If technology seems out of control, it is because our ideology has
exploited its destructive potential and is continually accelerating its
destructive power.What is wrong with modern technology is that it has
been fashioned in the image of our ideology and that it has been subjected
to its ends.147

Thus, Samek rejects structuralism and places the blame squarely on the
shoulders of our corrupt and dehumanizing mentality. Recognition of this
has a liberating and· therapeutic value - if the cause of the problem is
human agency; then human agency can also provide a possible solution.
All our seemingly intractable problems are eminently soluable and the
cures lie in our own hands ... The remedy is not to turn our back on
modem technology as such but to recreate it in a different image.This will
lead to the destruction of its destructive forms and to the salvaging of all
that is good in it by the constructive redeployment of its uses.148

Some may object at this point that Samek is an idealist . who, in
underestimating the power of structural constraints, can only provide
utopian solutions. Samek is acutely conscious of this possible criticism
and qualifies the foregoing. "All this is not to deny that the state of
technology of a particular society in a paraticular time frame is a factor
in shaping its ideology".149 Drawing on a continuum developed by
Joseph Femia,150 I would like to suggest that there are four possible
interpretations of the relationship between technology and ideology: (a)
ideology determines technology (idealism); (b) ideology and technology
interact on a more or less equal basis (common sense); (c) technology
determines the forms of ideology (structuralism); and (d) technology
determines which forms of ideology are possible (open). Samek, on my
interpretation, would fall within the fourth category; our social context
and our stage of development determine the range of possible outcomes,
"but free political and ideological activity is ultimately decisive in
determining which alternative prevails".151 Samek's is a constrained
voluntarism.
146. Id. at 56.
147. Id. at 112-113.
148. Id. at 140 and 1 13.
149. Id. at 1 13.
150. Gramsci's Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) at 121.
151. Id.
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This interpretation finds support in his posthumously published,
"Language, Communication, Computers and Law"152 which demon
strates that he is neither a luddite nor a fatalist. Although (or more
accurately, because) he recognizes the threat to humanity that computers
pose 153, he argues that properly understood and utilized, they may
advance humanity, in this case by facilitating research on the function of
the legal system and in improving the communicative functions of law. 1 54
In arguing that computers should be restrained as a means and not
considered as an end in themselves, he is battling to retain the normative
and purposive aspects of law against the tyranny of scientism. 155
One of the greatest dangers of technology is that it disempowers us,
"marvellously reducing our sense of responsibility", 156 undermining our
common humanity and reducing us to mere role occupants. A central
theme of Samek's philosophy is to negate the negation of the rich,
creative and dynamic force of purposive human action and to emphasize
the context-transcending capacity of humanity if only this awareness
could be realized and sufficient motivation developed. We need to regain
our faith in the power of human agency, "the motivation must be human
in the sense that it must draw on the open potential of human beings." 157
In relocating purposive human action centrestage, Samek inevitably
encounters the Pandora's box of moral, political and legal philosophy.
Which values ought we to pursue? Instead of balking at this subjectivist
void, and drawing inspiration from equity, 158 he does provide several
152. Supra, note 8.
153. Id. at 209-10.
154. Id. at 221.
155. Bruce Ackerman bas recently voiced similar concerns about the dark shadow of an
Orwellian technological imperialism.
For however skilled the computer analysts of the future become in finding relevant
facts, I see very few signs of a reawakening of the technocratic mind from its positivist
slumbers. Instead, my conversations with M.B.A.'s and M.P.A.'s and PhD.'s in
universities, industry and government have often revealed a commitment to a kind of
value discourse so primitive and vulgar that it would make even Chicago school
lawyers blush. (Reconstructing American Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1984) at 108-109.)
Ackerman's solution is to put our faith in the lawyers who, in his opinion, have historically
been the guardians of the virtuous society. The elitism of this proposal is highly problematic
since there is little evidence to suggest that lawyers would be (are?) any less technocratic than
computer specialists. Samek's proposed solution is that all experts should be kept in their cage,
and this includes lawyers and politicians. As we shall see, Samek is a radical democrat.
156. Supra, note 62 at 115.
157. Supra, note 5 at 414.
158. He is, of course, referring to a pre-positivist equity:
The heart of equity was the beating heart of justice and that could never be curtailed
in any system of rules . . . . In its heyday, equity did have the courage to take a deeper
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tentative guidelines. In 1976 he suggested that we pursue "the best and
sanest of those values .. . most consistently appealed to by the Canadian
people . . ., consistent with the kind of society we really want to live
in". 159 The following year he proposed " . . . those communal values most
commonly appealed to by the Canadian people . . ."160 and posited that
primary among these was the aspiration of respect for human life and
dignity. Finally, as we shall see, he advocates that we strive to fulfill the
fundamental human needs vital to human survival - anything else is
superficial and empty rhetoric. 161 Samek, it is suggested, is a radical
Kantian humanist.
These philosophical and epistemological claims have a radical impact
upon Samek's jurisprudence, most significantly in the proposition that
"the state of the law is no more stable than the state of the society with
which it is inextricably bound". 162 Although instability in "law, society or
anything else"163 cannot be mastered we can "learn to live with it"164 but
only if we recognize it. Unfortunately, the human craving for stability and
absolute solutions has had a "particularly distorting effect on law"165
making it appear that law is the antithesis of revolutionary and
discontinuous change. 166 Samek's claim is that stability in the law, and
even the common law vision of gradual change, is a "myth" that
obfuscates the reality.
Several consequences flow from this dynamic interpretation of law
and the legal process.The first is the very iconoclastic claim that, contrary
to the dominant conception, law is inherently subjective and therefore
can make no claims to a transcendent, absolute justice or "the good".
Kuhn's concept of the paradigm suitably adapted to the very different
discipline of legal philosophy provides a usdeful antidote to the truth that
the law is objective. It helps us become aware that legal phenomena can
look at the real problems behind the technical facade of law . . . when equity declined
from the personal directives of a court of conscience into a mechanical system of
technical rules, it lost its inspiration and its genuine potential for law reform. (Supra,
note 136 at 14-5.)
Furthermore, equity is the inspirational source of Samek's contractual theory. It is also
interesting to note that Roberto Unger, the guru of the C.L.S. movement, also draws on equity
in the development of his "deviationist" theory of contract law. "The Critical Legal Studies
Movement" (1983), 96 Harvard Law Rev. 563. Indeed, there is a remarkable correlation of
the themes, presuppositions and aspirations of the two jurists.
159. Supra,, note at 136 at 17 and 22.
160. Supra,, note 5 at 414.
161. Supra,, note 95 and 107 passim.
162. Supra,, note 62 at 88.
163. Supra,, note 93 at 558.
164. Supra,, note 62 at 107.
165. Id note 94.
166. Supra,, note 93 at 558.
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be apprehended only by virtue of a paradigm that treats them as genuine.
Conventional wisdom is wrong in classifying legal data as if they were
independent facts capable of being handled neutrally by legal value tools.
The whole process of classification . . . takes place within the ideological
cocoon of the paradigm.167

This, of course, allows him to go further and argue that there is no reason
why we should be unduly deferential to the Rule of Law; that radical
critique - indeed "revolution" - is essential if we are to progress; and
that there is no necessary right answer, "no one solution, let alone one
solution for all".168
A useful method for coming to terms with Samek's claim is his very
comprehensive discussion of legal doctrine which he perceives as a
quintessential aspect of the contemporary legal system. Samek's
argument is that the traditional legalistic approach which sees doctrine,
precedent and stare decisis as the foundation of an authoritative, but
adaptable, legal system is both misconceived and distorting. He applies
Kuhn's theory of paradigms, and their self-transcendence, to legal
doctrine, demonstrating a correspondence between the development and
decline of a doctrine and the pre-paradigm, mature paradigm, post
paradigm dynamic. In his difficult but thought-provoking "Fictions and
the Law"169 he argues that fictions (in which he includes legal doctrine)
are useful, indeed indispensable, 1 70 and even desirable 171 for an
understanding and ordering of the complexity and dynamic of human
interaction. The problem with them is that they tend to cease being a
means and take on a momentum and reality of their own. What starts as
a dynamic means turns out to be a static barrier to change.
Samek argues that legal doctrine, as a fiction, should not be conceived
as an end in itself, but rather as means to a social end - it should be
instrumental and flexible, not a priori Unfortunately, within the present
context legal doctrine is misused and plays a vital role in maintaining the
illusion that the law is both stable and self-contained.
In order to keep the law stable the strategy is to hide any changes which
are made by stretching the old concepts to accommodate the new .. . the
fiction allows . . . expansion; it appears that nothing has changed (and ) the
myth of stability is maintained. 172
167. Id at 557.
168. Id at 557-8. It is at this point that he parts company with Kantianism.
169. Supra, note 31.
170. ". . . the tendency to reason through fiction is fundamental to human thought." Id at
306.
171. Id at 313.
172. Id at 315. The example which Samek uses is the development from physical possession
to constructive possession.
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Thus, legal doctrine as fiction is a "conservative strategy for change", 173
a "strategy of dynamic conservatism". 174
The reason why these tactics are objectionable in Samek's eyes is not
because of the internal contradictions and anomalies which they can give
rise to (which are the bread and butter topics for legal academics) but
rather the external incongruity, manipulation and mystification which is
taking place. Samek claims that what appears to be a mere expansion of
a legal doctrine may in fact be a reflection and obfuscation of a major
shift in socio-political attitudes, a major policy change or a vital change
in the moral climate. We thereby encounter:
a vitally important disanology between law and science. Because law is
second order, the anomalies which erode a legal paradigm do not all or
even predominantly result from the internal development of legal doctrine,
but are merely the result of changes in the external moral and social
phenomena with which it deals. A new paradigm is needed to meet the
internal and external anomalies of the post-paradigm period.175

Samek's thesis makes sense of, and is reinforced by, two
contemporary developments. First, from the feminist perspective
Carol Gilligan has argued that the methods and results of traditional
psychological development theory, as exemplified by the work of
Kohlberg, are inadequate because they account for only one,
basically masculine, perspective. The "different voice" is ignored.
However, due to recent research and argument, what had been
paradigmatic has, through internal critique, passed into a post
paradigm stage. 176 This external development has had its effects
upon law and legal theory, since many of the male assumptions
built into the law are now being challenged. An excellent example
of this is Clare Dalton's thesis that Rawls' theoretical construct is
built upon an assumption of "macho in the original position".177
Another example may be the potential impact of the Charter on
the nature of decision-making by the Canadian judiciary. Since at
least the 1960s there has been a gradual shift away from the
173. Id
174. Supra, note 93 at 550. It is important that we remember that Samek is a subjectivist and
a relativist and therefore that he is not juxtaposing fiction and reality. Fictions are real insofar
as they contribute to our perception of the world; its what we do with them, not what they are,
that is important. Similarly, truth has no monopoly over reality for, as he suggests, "Truth is
stranger than fiction". (Supra, note 31 at 317.)
175. Supra, note 62 at 86.
176. Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981)
and I. Marcus and P. Spieglman, "Feminist Discourse: Moral Values and the Law, A
Conversation" (1986), Buffalo L.R. (forthcoming).
177. Clare Dalton, "Remarks on Personhood" (unpublished Paper presented to the Faculty of
Law, Queens University at Kingston, Spring 1985).
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paradigmatic judicial function of adjudication towards at least some
consideration of policy decisions. 178 The evidence tends to suggest
that this swing will continue. The proposition is that at the present
moment we are experiencing a post-paradigmatic epoch in legal
decision-making and that the judiciary are desperately seeking some
new terra firma on which to construct and legitimize their
increasingly policy-oriented decisions. A perfect example of this is
the contortions of both Madame Justice Wilson and Chief Justice
Dickson in the Operation Dismantle case. 179 Again I think it is
important that we reiterate the depth of Samek's claim, ". . .
paradigms are a theory of revolutionary discontinuity, an attack
against the traditional incremental view of (legal) progress". 180
The second key theme of Samek's radical jurisprudence is that
law can only, and must only, be understood in its social, moral and
political context. The tendency of lawyers to conceive of law as a
coherent, autonomous and self-contained discipline - manifested
for example in the theory of the separation of powers - is
explicitly rejected. Law, legal process and legal practice are both
refl€ctions of, and contributors to, the contemporary social matrix.
The obvious consequence of this contextualist claim is that law
should not be conceived of as an a priori end in itself. Law is
desirable only in so far as it is instrumental to the achievement of
some social good; or, to use the contemporary jargon, for Samek
the good is prior to the right.
Having recognized that law should be contextual, second order
and instrumental, Samek proceeds to argue that contrary to the
current tendency to seek a legal remedy to every social (and even
personal) problem, we should recognize the limits of law. He
suggests that we should always be reflective and query whether
recourse to the law is either pragmatic or useful:
. . . fundamental social ills may not be amenable to legal cures; legal
reform does not (necessarily ) entail social reform, and what might be
wrong with society is the underlying ideology that cannot be changed on
its own terms. Looked at in this light, the stability of law may be an evil
rather than a good in as much as it merely hides the social instability
· beneath and postpones the day of reckoning. 181

Working on this basis, he suggests that racism flourishes in Canada even
though the Constitution, as the symbolic representation of our very
178.
179.
180.
181.

Paul Weiler, "Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making" (1968), 46 Can. Bar Rev. 406.
Operation Dismantle et al v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 441.
Supra, note 62 at 82.
Id. at 105.
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liberal tolerance, would suggest otherwise. Law is inherently incapable of
solving the problem of racism; on the contrary, it tends to obscure the
reality and create false impressions about possible cures, "a society with
an innate sense of human rights does not need to embody them in
law". 182 What is required is moral, social, political and even economic
change which, at best, the law can only ratify. 183 This, in turn, should
encourage us to seek and develop alternative methods of achieving social
and personal goals.
The foregoing reference to rights would appear to contradict Samek's
earlier rejection of justice and rights in his discussion of Rawls and the
Charter. However, on reflection, I would suggest that there is no
contradiction in his work, that what Samek is rejecting is contemporary
conceptions of justice and rights and that he does have an alternative
powerful vision, but one which he only cryptically reveals.
Samek implies that by beginning with the ideal, Rawls' theory is
doomed because he starts at the wrong end of the spectrum. Samek
advocates that "we need to see justice in a new light", 184 that we must
look at society as it is presently constituted and recognize its inherent
inhumanity. In so doing we will realize that "to speak ofjustice in society
and in the world in which we live is to confound justice with custom". 185
Drawing on Pascal, 186 he argues that we ought not to confuse justice with
custom and goes as far as to suggest that at the present time they may be
opposites - ". . . if custom and law are not just then we should do our
utmost to free ourselves from their grip. True equity . . . is a challenge to
the law, not a gloss on it". 187
182. Supra, note 95 at 761.
183. Samek's claims apply verbatim to one of my own concerns, the problem of Northern
Ireland. For example, the recent "Hillsborough Accord" between Mrs. Thatcher and Dr.
Fitzgerald seeks to provide what is essentially a legal solution to a complex and multifaceted
social, economic, political, cultural and legal problem. Merely conferring a power on civil
servants from the government of the Republic of Ireland to review (but not veto) British policy
decisions and increasing the number of Catholics in the police, army and judiciary will not
solve any of the problems. Worse still, not only will it exacerbate the situation at home, abroad
it will create false impressions as to possible solutions. It is hard to believe that Mrs. Thatcher
and Dr. Fitzgerald really believe that this is the way towards a resolution of the situation and
this, in tum, suggests that the real motive behind the Accord is something else - the necessity
for "increased co-operation on security matters"Irepression, as the legitimation crisis deepens
in both Britain and Ireland.
184. Supra, note 107 at 807.
185. Id.
186. Although he praises Pascal for recognizing the distinction between justice, law and
custom, and the popular tendency to identify justice with law, he is fiercely critical of both
Pascal's elitism in maintaining the deception on the grounds th.at the people are incapable of
bearing the truth, and his transcendentalism in identifying justice with God.
187. Id. at 808-9.
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Striving to remain pragmatic (as opposed to idealist or practical) he
argues that to provide a definition of justice would not only confuse it
with custom - language as restrictive convention - but also would
misdirect the inquiry. Instead, rather obscurely, he adopts an
"existential"188 approach and directs our attention to the "paradox of
human existence in an inhuman world" 189 which we can take to mean
our reifying, consumerizing and commodifying world. Justice is "the
negation of the negation", the denial of the denial of our common
humanity and the recognition of "our fundamental equality".In a society
such as ours, racked as it is by commercialism and consumerism, with the
consequential massive inequality as manifested in the polarities of
extreme poverty and wasteful abundance, "if justice is to have any real
meaning, it must seek to correct this imbalance, it must concern itself
above all with the needs of the poor."190 Justice then is teleological,
praxis-oriented, a means to the end of fulfilling the needs of all human
beings, not philosophical idealism a la Rawls.Justice, therefore, cannot
be defined; it knows no boundaries, for the common needs of humanity
are forever expanding and contracting. Justice as needs points the way
but imposes no limits because the real needs of humanity, based as they
are on our open potential, are limitless. Conceptions of justice which
ignore these needs are simply rhetorical.
This radically humanist and egalitarian strain in Samek's thought
becomes even more explicit in his interpretation of the meaning of
fundamental rights. He argues that rights, as epitomized in the Charter,
have to be untrenched from their ideological (i e., legalistic) base, related
back to their origins in our common humanity and redirected towards
pragmatic social goals. Drawing heavily on William Conklin,191 - in
particular his themes of "common humaness", "potentiality", "process of
becoming", "inner sphere of life" and "open potentiality of persons" Samek claims that our individualism and entitlement to rights stem from
our common humanity, our membership of the human species.It is only
by giving up our differences, the "roles that swallow the man"192, that we
can assert our individualism.Samek illustrates his argument by reference
to handicapped persons:
. . . the handicapped are not entitled to any fundamental rights as such; but
they have as human beings the fundamental right not to be discriminated
against on the ground of physical or mental instability . . . they are
188. Id. at 810.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. In Defence of Fundamental Rights, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979).
192. Supra, note 95 at 775.
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protected against being treated as a special category of subhumans because
they are handicapped. Surely it is paradoxical that we first have to cripple
them as persons in order to compensate them in small part for the damage
we have done. 193

This humanist foundation allows him to develop a presuppositional
objection to a constitutionally entrenched Charter of Rights.
Fundamental rights are not a "handout . . . from any state or its officials"
and to accept them as such "is in effect to surrender them".194 Once we
are prepared to accept our rights as conferrals from the state we place
ourselves in its hands, for what the state has given it can also take away.
He warns us, at our peril, never to deny that the origins of our rights are
in human dignity.
A second objection to incorporation of rights into a charter is that in
being "documented" they become institutionalized, part of a
bureaucratice superstructure; as such rights lose their dynamic, the
charter ceases to be a means and becomes an end in itself.195
Rejecting the definitional and employing the existential approach he
argues passionately that we must conceive of rights in terms of primordial
fundamental rights necessary for survival as human beings. He posits that
in view of our "fundamental equality" it is "idle and obscene" for us to
talk about rights unless we recognize the "absolute priority of
fundamental needs" such as subsistence and survival. Rights, like justice,
are a way of responding to the human predicament; the paradox of
human existence in an inhuman world of exploitation, domination,
technological imperialism and life-depriving inequality.
. ..if fundamental rights are to have any real meaning they must above all
protect the claims of the poor; for just as the poor are the greatest victims
of inequality (and injustice ) so they suffer most from their rightlessness. 196

Again the emphasis is on pragmatic rights as a response to needs - ". . .
economic rights are not granted by generous governments .. . they are
the most basic fundamental rights since they are a response to man's most
fundamental needs".197 For Samek, rights (like justice and truth) are a
means to a better society, not an end in themselves; they are relative, not
absolute. Furthermore, they can never be exhaustively listed since they
are based upon the open potential of all human beings; they should, by
their nature, have a dynamic, open and liberating effect.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id
Id at 785.
Id at 757.
Id at 773.
Id
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To conclude, in the Samekian v1s10n, justice and rights are not
primarily legal. Being founded in the "bedrock of human existence" they
require a much deeper and broader perspective "than law can afford".198
However, he does not cast law on the scrapheap of ideological
mystification totally. He recognizes that law is vitally important in the
matrix of contemporary social interaction and he seeks to use law as
means to the good end of enhancing humanity - to convert legal law
into social law. It is to this that we can now turn.
IV. From Theory to Praxis: Social Law Reform
There is much to be said for stealth and subtlety as methods of revolution,
if revolution there must be.
Latham199

Samek's affirmative vision and programme is most explicitly articulated
in his "new philosophy of law reform"200 which prosletyses that
what needs to be done is to open up a whole new network of arteries and
veins of communication, conciliation and reconciliation to dispose of the
enormous range of social problems that are now being fed into the already
clogged channels of legislation and legal enforcement . . . searching for
new ways of solving old problems, putting (our ) trust not in the letter of
the law but in the spirit that first conceived it as an instrument of social
justice.201

Not only does this programme encapsulate the key themes of Samek's
thought, it also provides important guidelines about how we might begin
to constructively transcend the contingent but alienating "here" and
move towards an increasingly humanist "there".
Having recognized and reconciled himself with transience and the
inevitable dynamic of human and social interaction, Samek argues that
change is not necessarily for the better and that, contrary to our much
vaunted progress, we may be being increasingly sucked into the vortex of
destruction and negation.202 Yet, he refuses to succumb to fatalistic
pessimism. Inspired by his faith in the liberating potential of purposive
human agency, he reiterates the desideratum that "human freedom" be
"rechannelled"203 and that we respond to the economic, socio-political
and moral needs of contemporary society not only nationally but also
198. Id at 787.
199. The Law and the Commonwealth, (London: Oxford University Press, I 949) at 534.
200. Supra. note 136 at 2.
201. Id at 23.
202. In a veiled critique of traditional radicalism he argues that "revolutions made of hate and
despair can never usher in the new promised land . . . in the negation of the old . . . lies the
seed of the new". (Supra. note 62 at 91).
203. Id
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internationally on the basis of our common humanity. His aim is to fit
law, as the technique of social law reform, into this scheme. Again
utilizing and adapting Kuhn's paradigms he claims that contemporary
liberal society, ideology and law are riddled with such severe
contradictions that they must be perceived as being in their postparadigm period.
Law reform is most called for in the unsettled state of affairs of the post
paradigm era when the contradictions of the old paradigm era are taking
their toll.Its task there is to achieve a breakthrough from one paradigm to
another by giving form to what is inchoately present . . .law reform (can
be) paradigm-creating.204

The moment of weakness is the moment of emancipatory opportunity,
and unless we consciously and constructively seize the time the new
paradigm that· will emerge may be even more repressive. Law can, and
must, play a vital role in this period of radical and discontinuous change.
In order for this to happen, however, we must surrender our fetishized
attitude to law; we must reject any a priori conception of law and
recognize both its instrumental and contextual nature, that it is a means
to an end and not an end in itself.205 Similarly, we cannot and ought not
to isolate and divorce legal change from social change206 for the two
interact in a "dialectical process"207 - law reform is both a reactive
reflection of and a proactive response to the needs and dynamics of
society:
...although the immediate subject oflaw reform is law and the immediate
reason for reforming the law is dissatisfaction with the law as it is, the
ultimate subject matter of law reform is the complex of social practices
which are (or are not) regulated by the law of a given society, and that the
ultimate reason for reform of the law is dissatisfaction with our social
practices or some of them. The immediate task of the law reformer is to
bring about a change in the law but his ultimate task is to bring about a
change in social practices.208

The obvious lesson to be learned is that we must start at the right end we must begin with social practices not the law or doctrine; law must be
brought into line with desirable social practices, not the other way round.
This, he claims, entails a very different, socio-political conception of law
reform than traditional, horizontal, superstructural, ephemeral and
"legalistic law reform".
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Supra, note 5 at 424.
Supra, note 62 at 61-2 and 125.
Id at 103.
Supra, note 5 at 410.
Supra, note 62 at l.
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Neither the existing political system, nor the wider ideological framework
within which it operates presents an ultimate boundary to law reform
. . . .Law reform is not concerned with the legal superstructure but with
the underlying social problems. Hence we must always probe down
vertically beneath the legal symptoms to reach the roots of the social ills,
and we must follow these roots wherever they lead us. The real task of law
reform is the characterization and treatment of primary social phenomena.
The vertical view of law reform is the human view.209

Any other approach to law reform will be fruitless.
Always the pragmatist, however, Samek points out that the
dichotomies of legal and social, horizontal and verticaF10 are ideal typical
and that current law reform practice demonstrates traits of both
approaches, although it clearly favours the traditional approach. His aim
is to tilt the balance in the other direction so that social law reform has
priority.2 1 1 In recognizing the dynamic between legal and social law
reform, Samek attempts to maintain some middle ground between the
rock of "tinkering" and the hard place of utopianism in order that we can
begin to deal with the difficult problems which need to be dealt with here
and now. He admits that legal law reform may be essential as a stopgap
response to pressing issues but we must constantly remind ourselves that
it is no more than this; that it is neither a palliative nor a solution and that
it should be developed or transcended whenever possible, "even as we
patch we (must) think insistently and consistently of the bigger tasks . . .
we must not be sidetracked".212 Thus, although we may only be making
adjustments, our intention must always be "to adjust the present system
out of existence".213
Because contemporary society and law are in their twilight years, what
is. needed is a revolution, not a bloody or violent revolution but a
"fundamental, discontinuous and qualitative change".214 Social law
reform can fulfill a pivotal role as a "no man's land between reform and
revolution"215 because the reforms should, as far as possible, be
disconnected from their present polishing roles and utilized in their
209. Id at 28 and 33.
210. Throughout his polemic "The Objects and Limits of Law Reform" (supra, note 62), he
develops these polarities to include: legal/social; horizontal/vertical; internal/external;
narrow/ ( very) wide; semantic/ purposive; practical/ pragmatist; realist/ visionary;
incrementalism/transcendence; present/future; closed/open; complacent/radical; unidimen
sional/muntidimensional; incoherent/consistent; impervious/ perspicuous; static/ dynamic;
simple/complex; adversarial/ conciliation; traditional/new; mechanical/human.
211. Id at 16; see al5o, supra,note 176 at 10.
212. Id at 102.
213. Id at 123
214. Id at 14.
215. Id
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primary sense of "re-form".216 More specifically, the revolution of which
Samek speaks is one of our perceptions, our weltanschauung, a
rationalization of what is important and what is not, what is desirable and
what is not, what could be achieved if we only wanted to, and how it
could be achieved. Samek is talking about a revolution that recognizes
purposive human agency, empowerment, respect for human dignity
(with all that that entails), and the inevitability of subjectivity.
Fundamental to Samek's affirmative vision is his faith in the self
emancipatory capacity of humanity217 and it is for this reason that he
portrays his crusade as "aspirational law reform".218 Since law is always
in a state of flux it is up to us to decide whither we wish to take it in view
of the unavoidable "inadequacy of conventionally accepted solutions".2 19
Therefore, the underlying dynamic of aspirational law reform ought not
to be any mechanistic, structural or systems imperative but rather socio
human needs and the creative force and open potential of human
motivation, "the will to change manifesting itself'.220
Law cannot be reformed from within; it must be reformed from without.
This requires transcending the prevailing ideology by raising our
consciousness and refocusing law on the reality to come.What we need is
a revolutionary change in our "world view" brought about creatively by
the personal efforts of individuals and not mere mechanical change in
ideology imposed on us from above.221

Samek seeks to develop aspirational law reform as a technique to
counteract the ontological barrier of humankind's fear of change. He
argues that our petrified paralysis is a by-product of our debilitating
"advanced" society and that the only way back to empowerment is
through action - and social law reform is one, but only one, way in
which we can begin to do this. This entails a rejection of the myth that
legal expertise is an essential pre-condition for law reform222 and
recognition that the "ultimate responsibility for law reform must remain
inalienably"223 with "the concerned citizen".224 This, of course, relates to
his radically democratic vision of society because not only is "public
participation a sine qua non of a free society"225 but also the public must
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Supra, note 5 at 420.
Vice versa, he also believes in humankind's destructive capacity.
Supra, note 62 at 99-102.
Id. at 102.
Id.
Id. at l07.
Supra, note 136 at 124-5.
Id. note 25.
Supra, note 5 at 414.
Supra, 136 at 25.
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be encouraged to accept their human and civic responsibilities by "being
persuaded to apply their shoulder to the social wheel rather than cast the
burden on a already overburdened legal machine".226 Participation and
empowerment are closely interconnected:
. . . in a really free and democratic society every decision should make a
human difference and consume human energy - the energy of the person
making it, of those implementing it and those who are affected by it.227

Samek is, of course, aware that real reforms are only possible when
people are prepared to pay the price, that internal motivation is essential
if we are to bring about changes in social practices and that the trick is
to encourage people to recognize their benefits as well as their losses.228
As a consequence of both its humanist foundation 229 and the certainty
of evanescence, social law reform must be conceived of as an ever open,
dynamic, self-reflective, self-revitalizing, non-permanent process which
accepts that there is no one solution good for all time for any social
problem.
There are many tasks of law reform, not just one.There are many agents
of law reform not just one. There is no ideal solution, only a straining of
solutions, a confronting of contradictions and a persistence in eliminating
them . . . _230

It must be visionary and progressive, continually encompassing new
territory and opening up new horizons, seeking out "potentials that can
be realized''231 and attempting to achieve them through an activist role in
the development of contemporary social practices. Ultimately, social law
reform is:
the complement, the conscience of the law. Since it is based upon the open
potential of human motivation, it cannot be closed by any ideology, and
since it acknowledges paradigmatic change it cannot be locked into any
paradigm . . .it is incurably relative in both space and time232 • . • social
226. Id. at 24.
227. Supra, note 62 at 128.
228. A useful parallel can again be drawn from the impact of the feminist movement. If we
males respond to feminist arguments, then inevitably our positions of power and prestige will
suffer not only psychologically but also socially, financially and hierarchically. On the other
hand, we may well benefit in non-tangible ways because in recognizing and developing
"feminine attributes and values" we may reap the benefits of a more empathetic and caring
world view. But it is difficult for even sympathetic males to come to terms with t�ese
imponderables.
229. ". . . the uncertainty of the dynamic creative force of human motivation is vital to a self
sustaining human system that must necessarily always transcend any particular form." Supra,
note 62 at 31.
230. Id. at 34.
231. Id. at 23.
232. Suora. note 5 at 435.
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law reform has no fixed boundaries, it must create its own homeland and
yet it must never settle there.233

Samek strives to be as pragmatic as possible in his suggestions for the
methods of social law reform. Drawing on the L.P. V. he argues that
legalism and legislation should not have a monopoly on the methods of
law reform because they entail coercive and repressive techniques which
may be unsuitable for the resolution of many social problems. Even when
prophylactic, such measures are limited in that their aim is prevention
rather than the promotion of the good; for example, through conciliation
and reconciliation.234 Second, and more importantly, since our starting
point must always be primary social phenomena rather than the law, law
reform must be a "very wide"235 purposive and contextual response to the
multifaceted m_ultiplicity of social and human problems. Legalism will
therefore be only one of several potential solutions, "and not the
exclusive or even predominent one".236 The required flexibility in law
reform can only be "brought about by moral, economic, political,
psychological, sociological, educational and other methods which are
conducive to its ultimate object of changing social practices".237
Further, with uncharacteristic detail, he develops a five point
functionalist blueprint for the programme of radical law reform:
a) Reception; picking up signals from the community that something
1s awry.
b) Monitoring; empirical research to follow-up the signals.
c) Evaluation; a comprehensive determination of the source of the
discontent.
d) Recommendation; response to the problem and suggestions for
reform.
e) Implementation; in the "most appropriate manner".238
This process is, of course, self-repeating.
The reader might object that the foregoing implies Samek's acceptance
of institutions as a necessary vehicle for social law reform but that this
contradicts his earlier claims for the desirability of human motivation and
the concerned citizen as reformer. The answer to this, I think, is that
Samek wants to get from here to there without becoming utopian, by
blurring the line between reform and revolution and by using the
potential of contemporary society and its institutions to transcend itself.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id at 409.
Supra, note 136 at 23.
Supra, note 62 at 45.
Id at 40.
Id
Id at 124.
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He argues that the break with the past and present cannot be clean, that
the new must rise from the old:
...what is required is that we raise our consciousness as human beings
and see the institutions and the roles they play in a new perspective.This
raising of consciousness, if it is to become more general or acceptable,
requires a change in existing institutions, but they must be changed from
within until they are ready to be changed from without.239
In

an ideal world contemporary institutions would be undesirable indeed superfluous - but this is certainly not an ideal world and
institutions are what we've got and so we must render them as responsive
as possible - ". . . institutions may be used but they must always remain
under human control and their efficiency must be judged in human terms
and in regard to huma� acts".240
Samek's own relationship with the Law Reform Commission of
Canada can be interpreted as an attempt to put this theory into practice.
He demonstrates a restrained praise for its Working Papers on The
Criminal Process and Mental Disorder, 241 Diversion242 and Imprisonment
and Release243 because of their broader, critical perspectives and their
suggestions for alternative solutions. He also makes several positive
comments about the Commission's independence of mind, sense of vision
and early determination.244 While a consultant with the Commission he
wrote several reports245 which provide the foundation for the radical turn
in his thought and his switch of emphasis from philosophy to praxis. He
viewed the Law Reform Commission "by reason of the very ambiguity
of its institutional status" as a Trojan horse within the legal system with
a capacity to "prepare the ground for radical law reform".246
Unfortunately, the Commission proved to be insufficiently responsive
(overly constrained) and as the 1970s wore on it became less socio
oriented. Samek left the Commission, by all accounts very disappointed.
Indeed, his last publication is a sustained critique of the Commission's
work on euthanasia, which he accuses of bearing all the hallmarks of
legalistic, technical and metaphysical law reform.247
239. Id at 121.
240. Supra, note 5 at 426.
241. No. 14 (1975), supra, note 136 at 4-5.
242. No. 7 (1975), id at 16.
243. No. 11 (1975), id
244. Id 21 and supra, note 62 at 6.
245. "The Objects and Limits of Law Reform" 1976; "Pornography", 1976; "The Philosophy
of Law Reform", 1976.
246. Supra, note 62 at 131. For example, he points out that s. l l(d) of the Law Reform
Commission Act could allow for a programme of social law reform.
247. Supra, note 8.
Samek's "failure" at the Commission tends to suggest a weakness in his constructive theory; his
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Again the reader might object that Samek is deliberately confusing the
issues, that his programme is really political and that it has nothing to do
with law, except in name. Samek pre-empts and rebuts this objection on
two grounds: first, although his law reform proposals are revolutionary,
they are still legal in that law takes on a teleological, contextual role as
an important player in the campaign of social transformation.248 Second,
in a legalistic society such as ours almost all social change is tied in some
way or other to "the apron strings of legislation"; legislation is always
inextricably involved, either to ratify social change or to bring the
anachronistic legal system irito line.249 Law, in the present historico
political conjuncture, is . a vital arena in which the battle for social
transformation must be fought.
This socio-political and pragmatic approach to law reform, through
which law becomes praxis, obviously exposes Samek to the traditional
objection that what is desirable is the rule of objective law not subjective
men (sic). Samek's response is simple (and all the more radical for being
so): "The social neutrality of law is a myth".250 By this stage this claim
should come as no surprise to us, nor should his supporting arguments.
First, since human agency is a central factor in his thesis, then human
involvement in, and responsibility for, the nature and extent of the
current legal system is unavoidable. Second, because our primary
concern is with social practices, and law is an encrustation upon these,
then law inevitably reflects and reinforces the values of such practices ".. .as a functional instrumentality law can never be neutral; it is always
on the side of the values it seeks to enforce".251 Thus, for example, he
argues that the decision whether or not to enforce certain social practices
inevitably involves a value judgement and that even non-enforcement is
a subjective value judgement to preserve the status quo. Non-action is just
as political as activism.252 And again, in discussing the process of judicial
decision-making he posits that legal reasoning is an ex post facto
underestimation of the strength of structural constraints and his overly optimistic perception of
human agency. For example, at a recent conference on the penal system almost everyone
present, and in particular those who work within the system, adopted a critical humanist
perspective, and yet despite this "consensus" the feeling at the end of the conference was that
little could or would change. It may be, however, that we should not be so pessimistic, that as
the 1980s progress there is still a flickering and perhaps increasing sense of dissatisfaction and
a festering desire to transcend the limits of the present. The tragedy of Bob Samek is that, in
being ten years too early, he was a "loner" incapable of doing very much to actively bring
about that which he so sincerely believed.
248. Supra, note 62 at 44.
249. Supra, note 136 at 4.
250. Id at 21.
251 . Supra, note 62 at 66.
252. Id
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rationalization of what the judge considered to be a just or politically
correct decision.
... according to legal convention decisions are reached on the basis of
legal reasoning. In fact this is hardly ever so.Judges are usually prepared
to do justice through the law ...judges for the most part use the law, they
look for a way of doing what they consider to be right ...253

Thus, in the Patriation case:
the policy decision came first and the legal reasoning followed suit ...
indeed this makes sense. Law is the cart not the horse - it is harnessed to
the social values which it serves and has not a life of its own.254

Samek's claim is very strong; it is both descriptive and prescriptive.
Judicial activism is both unavoidable and desirable:
... a court's decision should always be normative not conventional; it
should be based on what ought to be done and not what is conventionally
accepted . .. where the political context is crucial to implementing the
social objectives of law the judges must have the courage to speak out.255

Likewise, law reform must grasp the subjectivist nettle; indeed this is
inevitable once its ultimate concern is recognized to be social practices
where "very fundamental value judgements"256 are unavoidable. The law
reformer, as the conscience of the law, must be prepared to make value
judgements and decisions at every one of the five stages of law reform257
and she must be willing to propose "revolutionary changes if (she)
believes they are called for".258 Samek struggles hard to strike a balance
between the individualistic and subjective decisions of the reformer and
Canadian community values. He explicitly rejects crest of the wave
majoritarianism - " . . . the law reformer should not be a rubber stamp
of so-called popular demands - progressive or conservative unrefined by (her) own evaluation,"259 and although he advocates that
the final decision must rest with the reformer he simultaneously abjures
253. "Law and Convention", supra, note 102 at 35.
254. Id. There is a very real danger that Samek may be overstating his case in his enthusiasm
for teleological judicial reasoning. Law is not, at least at the present time, infinitely malleable;
there are important structural constraints which limit its radical utility. Samek, it is suggested,
should have been more cautious in his optimism for judicial activism. I would agree that the
law is inextricably entwined with value judgements, but that due to the nature of the legal
process and legal hierarchy these values are conservative and retrospective. I would be very
skeptical of viewing the Canadian judiciary as a vanguard for progressive transcendence!
Recent Charter decisions reinforce my concerns.
255. Id. at 84.
256. Supra, note 136 at 7.
257. Supra, note 62 at 26-7 and 40.
258. Id. at 84.
259. Suora. note 136 at 22.
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arbitrary and idiosyncratic preferences in proposing that reformers be
"sure of their ground (before) depart(ing) from the communal values".260
Again reconstructing Samek's variegated comments, it would appear
that the "communal values" which he refers to are those that have their
roots in our espousal of our respect for human dignity and life.261 His aim
is to take us at our word, articulate the social, political, legal and even
economic consequences of "high falutin"' moral claims, estop us from
transgressing them, and shove them back down our hypocritical throats!
Not only must we have regard for the primordial human needs vital for
survival, we must seriously respect all our fellow human beings. Thus, for
example, law reformers should condemn both capital punishment and
inhuman forms of imprisonment, first because it is doubtful if they
achieve any desirable social goal, and second (and more importantly)
because they are inconsistent with respect for human dignity.262 Once
again it is a radical humanism which underlies his vision of aspirational
law reform. This, of course, is only a starting point and, fully conscious
of the pluralistic nature of Canadian society, he suggests that we should
"engage in a living dialogue of values which will result in a richer and
more open mosaic".263 This, however, is futile until we resolve the
primary concern of respect for human life and dignity.
Samek not only theorizes about the nature, methods, purposes and
form of social law reform, he also makes specific suggestions for reform
of the law relating to pornography and euthanasia. He argues that the
traditional approach to pornography264 has been to perceive it as one
aspect of the obscenity issue and opines that this approach is
misconceived. His argument, in brief, is that in trying to squeeze
pornography into the obscenity basket we are adopting an essentialist
approach, seeking an underlying unifying factor for what are, in fact,
diverse social and moral practices. This leads to wrong diagnoses, wrong
recommendations and wrong solutions. "One of the great dangers of the
essence approach is that it tends to lump together quite distinct problems
under the cloak of essential homogeneity".265 Recognition of the

,,

260. Supra, note 5.
261. This interpretation is based upon phrases such as:
the best and sanest of those values consistent with the kind of society we really want
to live in", supra, note 36 at 22; "those communal values most consistently appealed
to by the Canadian people", supra, note S at 414, and "our preferred values should be
those which we purport to prefer and as long as we pay lip service to them we shoulcl
be estopped from going back on them", id. at 424.
262. Supra, note 5 and note 136 at 22.
263. Id.
264. Supra, note 91.
265. Id. at 269.
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limitations of the essentialist approach has an emancipatory effect; it
allows us to look at the issues in a more direct manner, determine what
we think is wrong and decide if law can be of any instrumental value in
providing a possible solution. His critique opens up new horizons and
allows for the pursuit of alternative, more effective, solutions.
Samek then draws an importa�t distinction between first-order sexual
behaviour, within which he includes "overt sexual behavior, normal or
abnormal, self-directed or other-directed . . . for example, group sex,
beastiality, masturbation, indecent exposure, and sexual fantasies" and
second-order sexual behaviour which includes "pornography, running
theatres, brothels, strip joints, massage parlours, etc.".266 Samek's concern
is a limited one - how to deal with the second-order sexual activity of
pornography.267 Taking the Law Reform Commission's Study Paper on
Obscenity268 to task, he argues that the problem of pornography is linked
to the enslaving, exploitative, alienating, dehumanizing and commodify
ing nature of a commercialized capitalist society. Sex has been stripped of
its spiritual and human dimension and turned into a commodity; the
participants have been reified and the voyeurs consumerized.269 Samek's
diagnosis is that the evil of pornography is to be found in the undue
commercial exploitation of sex. Law, he suggests, can make a limited
contribution to the solution of the problem, but not the criminal law
because it is clumsy, misdirected, and ineffective. The alternative
approach suggested is that after sustained empirical research has been
carried out, administrative measures - specifically, expensive licencing
and taxation - should be developed to hit the porn industry where it
hurts - financially. The decisions should be made on the admittedly
subjective criteria of "undue," "commercial" and "exploitation" by
administrative tribunals.270 But again, dealing with the social problems of
pornography through legal administrative solutions should not be an end
in itself; rather, it is a means to an end, an imaginative and empowering
first step towards a more humane and mutually responsive society.
266. Id at 270-1.
267. It is important to recognize the modesty of his proposal; the distinction between first-and
second-order activity is strategic, not a priori He believes that state intervention in first-order
sexual behaviour would be the enforcement of morals in the stronger sense, and therefore
unacceptable. But that does not commit us to any "anything goes" philosophy; because there
are important differences between first- and second-order behaviour, there may be state
intervention in second-order but not first-order behaviour. He sees "no inherent contradiction
between being a sexual freedom fighter and an opponent of pornography". ("Pornography",
supra, note 92 at 54.)
268. No. 23 (1972).
269. Supra, note 91 at 275-8.
270. Id at 281-7.
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Samek's posthumously published "Euthanasia and Law Reform"271 is
a very powerful and passionate manifestation of his shift from theory to
praxis, or at least the subjugation of philosophy to social necessity.
(With regard to euthanasia ) it is wrong_ to start off with the law as it is or
with the existing philosophical categorizations.Rather we should look at
the dissatisfaction that is expressed with the primary practice or the
controlling secondary practice ... .The complaints that surface are about
the roadblocks that face the dying and incurably ill who want to be
released from their suffering and the meaninglessness of their lives.272

Thus, for example, he rejects the distinction between active and passive
euthanasia as being not only legalistic and metaphysical, but also false in
view of the advanced nature of modern technology and our already
highly dependent drug culture.273
He draws our attention to the reality - that we already practice
euthanasia under the legitimating misnomers of "allowing to die" and
"pain-killing" and yet we insist on preserving the illusion and prolonging
the agony. Law reform should concern itself with the basic issue (which
is normative, not logical). How should we respect the dignity of the
patient? The first step is to set our thinking straight and to recognize that
part of the problem lies in the pejorative slant which language now
projects into the word "euthanasia" by identifying it with "murder".In its
original Greek form "euthanasia" had meant "happy death", but even if
at the present it doe� mean killing we must look at the context and not
the emotive term. "If it is killing it is justified killing and one of the
gentlest and most humane known to man."274
This allows us to understand euthanasia as a situation in which:
a competent person who is dying or suffering from an incurable or fatal
illness requests a registered medical practitioner to terminate his suffering
and the practitioner grants his request, primarily out of compassion.275
27 l . Supra, note 8.
272. Id at 78-9.
273. Id at 92-4. He also ridicules a variety of legerdemain in the contemporary debate and the
interest group opportunism of those seeking symbols and causes at the cost of human dignity:
. . . almost every day we read or hear of horror stories in which persons have been
subjected to painful and demeaning medical treatment against their will. The so-called
mercy deaths are an exception and they have become more and more rare as more and
more busybodies organize for their own ends to enforce outdated lega{ statutes against
the defenceless and hopelessly ill. What could be more undignified than having to fight
long, drawn-out legal battles against the powers of the state in order to be allowed to
die with dignity. (Id at 1 13.)
He is particularly scathing about the hypocrisy of the pro-life movement. (Id at 110-1.)
274. Id at 90.
275. Id.
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Such an interpretation reinforces the disconnection of euthanasia and
execution and emphasizes the happy, peaceful and willing aspects of it.
Euthanasia is, therefore, archetypically voluntary and the law should
respect the wishes of the petitioner. Non-voluntary euthanasia, as in the
case of a comatose patient, should be legally permissible provided that
the "appropriate protective procedures are followed". Involuntary
euthanasia poses no problems for it is a contradiction in terms.276
Third, Samek's ultimate argument is that respect for human life
necessarily entails respect for the quality of that life and the process of
dying. If the patient chooses to die then the state ought to facilitate as
peaceful, as painless and as compassionate a death as is possible.277
The patient's request is simple. He sees no point in going on when he has
nowhere to go; he wants to end his days without being a further burden
to himself and his family . . . . What right has the state to say no? . . . . To
have to come to the state cap in hand, in extremis to be allowed to die a
little faster shows the condition of slavery to which we have sank. If it is
right to keep the government out of the bedrooms of the nation, it surely
has no place on our deathbeds.278

The ultimate question is, of course - What is Samek's prognosis for
the future? In view of what has gone before, any such question is, in one
sense, unfair. Samek, the unrepentant relativist, does not, indeed cannot,
offer us any general theory of law; law of the past is different from law
of the present and both are necessarily different from law of the future.
Thus, the legal point of view is inaccurate and inapposite as a description
of primitive societies because they had no enforcement mechanism;
similarly, "simply because the legal point of view has remained prevalent
in the so-called socialist countries does not mean that it is here to stay".279
The one lesson that history can teach us is that the future is open, that it
is in our hands.
Although our immediate task is to follow on from the preceding
examples of subversive, pragmatic, and immanent transcendence this
should only take place within a larger, more speculative framework.
Samek suggests that, although ideals are unobtainable in a very imperfect
world such as ours, that does not mean that we should forgo them
completely and succumb to the stultifying dead weight of practicality. On
the contrary, fully conscious that they are unachievable, we should
perceive ideals as elusive but inspirational goals which keep driving us on
276. Id at 101-7.
277. Samek is also careful to point out that doctors also have a choice; they cannot be forced
to respond to a patient's request.
278. Supra, note 8 at 114.
279. Supra, note 62 at 54.
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towards fulfilling not only our insatiable, creative potential but also in
structuring a society conducive to mutation and responsive to our human
needs.Idealism can be of heuristic value.280
The Samekian ideal with regard to law is that its coercive, repressive
and enforcing aspects be "reduced to the vanishing point",281 and that
this, for the time being at least, should be our ultimate goal.
Simultaneously, however, we must temper our optimism that a
Kropotkinian society of mutual aid and "spontaneous harmony" could
ever exist, "that we will ever be able to dispose completely with some
enforcement mechanism for recalcitrant cases"282 But again, we must also
curtail our pessimism and our consequential idolatry for the adversarial
system.Samek's suggestions are twofold. First, we should recognize both
the limitations and alienating tendency of the law. Law is inherently
incapable of filling in for the increasing poverty of human intercon
nectedness and social cohesiveness; on the contrary, it tends to exacerbate
the centrifugal dynamics. Therefore, "reduction should be the order of the
day".283 Second, "there is no good reason why persuasion, conciliation
(and reconciliation) cannot increasing! y take the place of legal
sanctions"284 in the resolution of social and interpersonal conflict. Such
techniques are not only cheaper, quicker and less traumatic, their
therapeutic, healing value is more lasting and prospective than the
pathological adversarial system. The barriers to such a change in
emphasis are not structurally determined; they lie within ourselves, the
direct product of our prejudices, lack of vision, and self-interested
positions in the legal-bureaucratic hierarchy.
Conclusion

V.

A man more sinned against than sinning.

Shakespeare, King Lear

The year 1984 was a bad one for Canadian jurisprudence. It saw the
passing of three of Canada's leading jurists: Bora Laskin, F.R.Scott and
Robert Samek. However, while the contributions of both Laskin and
Scott have been widely recognized, celebrated and even criticized,
Samek's input has remained virtually unknown. The Canadian legal
community should be ashamed of itself.
The researching and writing of this essay has been a jurisprudential
archaeological dig. I have attempted to sift through what now exists of
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id at 58.
Id at 94.
Id at 56.
Id at 65.
Id at 56.
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Samek's (legal) life and work, to distinguish the important from the
unimportant, to follow through on some of the cryptic clues and finally
to reconstruct, in the best light possible, Samek's interpretation and vision
of jursiprudence and law reform. It is my sincere hope that I have done
justice (whatever that might mean) to his work.
Traditionally, academics have discussed the work of another either to
build their own reputation on the (broken) back of their predecessor, or
at least to suggest tentative criticisms or further insights into what has
gone before. I resist this imperative/temptation not because I accept
blindly Samek's arguments - indeed I have several fundamental
reservations - but because that is not the purpose (point of view) of this
article. My aim has been modest: to (re)introduce the Canadian
jurisprudential community to the critical claims of one of its own. If it can
be said that Canada's· legal historians have been masochists,285 then its
jurists have been sadists insofar as they have inflicted the worst injury
possible on one of their peers - wilful ignorance of his work.286 This
essay has been no more than an attempt to rectify this wrong in the hope
that others might now wish to go back to re-evaluate Samek's
contribution to Canadian jurisprudence.
My own opinion is that it has been substantial. Inspired by a plethora
of continental thinkers, in particular Marx, Neitzsche and Wittgenstein,
Samek broke the chains of postivistic colonialism and struck out into
uncharted jurisprudential regions. As the first post-modern Canadian
jurist, he attempted to reconnect jurisprudence with some of the wider
debates developing in the philosophical community. Aspects of his work
are reminiscent of certain trends within feminism and even echo the
claims of philosophy's en/ant terrible - deconstructionism. More
importantly, Samek sought to contextualize jurisprudence, to ensure that
it remained relevant to the current .politico-historical conjuncture, and to
develop it as a pragmatic critique of the inequality and hierarchy of post
industrial society. Proactively, he sought to infuse the rationalist Rule of
Law with a hefty dose of irrational (com)passion and humanity.
For his sins, he was peripheralized.
(c) Richard F. Devlin 1987
285. G. Parker, "The Masochism of the Legal Historian" (1 974), U. of T. L.J. 279.
286. The one exception to this criticism is Christine Boyle whose work, on occasion, makes
particular reference to Samek's vision of social Jaw reform.
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